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WORLDWIDE HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM:
DIMENSIONS AND LEGAL DETERMINANTS
Dionysia Katelouzou∗
In recent years, activist hedge funds have spread from the United
States to other countries in Europe and Asia, but not as duplicates of the
American practice. Rather, there is a considerable diversity in the
incidence and the nature of activist hedge fund campaigns around the
world. What remains unclear, however, is what dictates how commonplace
and versatile hedge fund activism will be in a particular country. This
Article addresses this question by pioneering a new approach to
understanding the underpinnings and the role of hedge fund activism,
following activist hedge funds as they select a target company that presents
high–value opportunities for engagement (entry stage), accumulate a
nontrivial stake (trading stage), then determine and employ their activist
strategy (disciplining stage), and finally exit (exit stage). The Article then
identifies legal parameters for each activist stage and empirically examines
why the incidence, objectives, and strategies of activist hedge fund
campaigns differ across countries. The analysis is based on 432 activist
hedge fund campaigns during the period of 2000–2010 across 25 countries.
The findings suggest that the extent to which legal parameters matter
depends on the stage that hedge fund activism has reached. Mandatory
disclosure and rights bestowed on shareholders by corporate law are found
to dictate how commonplace hedge fund activism will be in a particular
country (entry stage). Moreover, the examination of the activist ownership
stakes reveals that ownership disclosure rules have important ramifications
for the trading stage of an activist campaign. At the disciplining stage,
however, there is little support for the conjecture that the activist objectives
and the employed strategies are a reflection of the shareholder protection
regime of the country in which the target company is located.
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INTRODUCTION
Shareholder activism is a long–standing feature of corporate
governance. Yet it is only since the 2000s that it has swept through the
corporate landscape, receiving a big boost from activist hedge funds and
other shareholder activist funds that are able to influence the conduct of
corporate affairs with small, non-controlling stakes.1 Hedge funds
investing in shareholder activism have a history of about two decades: they
first appeared in the United States in the aftermath of the “deal decade” of
the 1980s and moved to the forefront in the mid–2000s before dropping
significantly during the 2008 financial crisis, but since 2012 they have been
thriving again.2
Among the reasons accounting for the flourish of hedge fund activism
in the years after the financial crisis is the fact that investor cash has flown
back into the hedge fund sector and activist managers have amassed their
own cash reserves fueled by rising stock prices and cheap debt.3 As a
result, activist hedge funds have grown in size and are now more able to
take significant positions in big companies and pressure for changes in
business strategy or leadership.4
Characteristically, a columnist
emphasized in June 2013 that “[n]o company is too large for hedge fund
activism.”5 Recent targets of activist hedge funds include large American
1.
The practitioners of this brand of shareholder activism are not a homogenous
group. “Activist hedge fund” is a term of art and there are a growing number of investors,
other than hedge funds, that have emerged prepared to engage in hedge-fund-style
shareholder activism. For the purposes of this study, the term activist hedge fund is used as
a generic one that includes a variety of investment vehicles, which all share a common
feature: they build up sizeable stakes in order to influence the conduct of corporate affairs.
On the nature of this brand of shareholder activism, see infra text with accompanying notes
22–38.
2.
See, e.g., Michael J. de la Merced, Taking Recipes From the Activist Cookbook,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2014, at F10 (citing data from FactSet indicating that about 281 activist
hedge fund campaigns targeting U.S. companies have been announced in 2014—the greatest
amount in at least five years).
3.
Emily Chasan & Maxwell Murphy, Activist Investors Go Big, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1,
2013, at B6.
4.
According to data from HFR Inc., at the end of 2012, U.S. activist funds had $65.5
billion under management, which is the highest in a decade. In 2003, they had $11.8 billion.
Anupreeta Das & Sharon Terlep, Activist Fights Draw More Attention, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
19, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324392804578360370704215
446. In 2013, the upward trend continued as U.S. activist hedge funds were estimated to
hold nearly $100 billion in assets under management. David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh,
Corporate Governance Update: Shareholder Activism in the M&A Context, 251 N.Y. L.J. 5
(2014).
5.
Jonathan Shapiro, Hedge Funds’ Time Has Come Again, AUSTL. FIN. REV., June 7,
2013, at 23.
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companies such as Apple, Hess, Procter & Gamble, Air Products, PepsiCo,
and eBay.6 Recent years have seen some activist hedge fund campaigns
targeting big companies outside the United States too. Activist hedge fund
investor Daniel Loeb’s Third Point accumulated a sizeable stake in Sony
Corp., the Japanese electronics maker, and pushed for change, while The
Children’s Investment Fund (“TCI”) took a stake in French aerospace
company EADS in an attempt to force it to sell its stake in Dassault
Aviation.7
In addition, despite first appearing to be unsympathetic to the interests
of the shareholders as a class, hedge fund activism is increasingly gaining
in reputation.8 A columnist in The Economist observed similarly that
activist shareholders have turned “from villains into heroes.”9 At the same
time, hedge fund activism is getting growing support from large
institutional investors, many of which are now teaming up with activist
hedge funds to jointly launch activist campaigns.10 This change in
institutional investors’ attitudes is driven, at least in part, by the activist
sector’s robust returns; according to a Citigroup report, activist hedge funds
have generated nearly 20 percent annual returns since 2009, outperforming
traditional hedge funds and many markets.11
Recent evidence addressing the long–standing debate of whether
activist hedge funds do more harm than good to the target firm and its other
shareholders has also contributed to the change in how activist hedge funds
6.
David Benoit, New Push to Throw Assets Overboard, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2014,
at C1; Ben Fox Rubin, Carl Icahn Pushes Apple on Buyback, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2013, at
B8.
7.
Dan McCrum, Activists Keep Fighting Despite Setbacks, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 17,
2013, at 12.
8.
Compare James Saft, In Praise of Activist Investment, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/14/us-column-activistinvestors-saftidUSBRE97D17I20130814 (explaining the benefits of activist hedge funds), with Andrew
Willis, Corporate Raiders Now Wearing the White Hat, GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 18, 2005, at
B16 (contending that activist managers no longer greatly affect stock price by just showing
up).
9.
M.B., How Activist Shareholders Turned from Villains into Heroes, ECONOMIST
(Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/02/economistexplains-12.
10. For instance, in November 2012, California State Teachers’ Retirement System
(CalSTRS) cooperated with activist Relational Investors LLC to call for diversified
manufacturer Timken Co. to split its steel and bearings businesses into separately-traded
companies, while in August 2011, Canadian pension fund Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan
together with U.S. hedge fund Jana Partners pushed McGraw–Hill to break up. Randy
Diamond, CalSTRS Takes Bold Step in Governance, PENSIONS & INVS., Apr. 29, 2013, at 4.
11. See David Gelles, Activism Is Going Global, Citi Warns Clients, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Oct. 31, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/activism-is-goingglobal-citi-warns-clients/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (warning clients that shareholder
activism has spread globally to all types of companies).
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are perceived by the investing public and the popular press. Many
empirical studies report that activist hedge fund campaigns generate
abnormal stock returns, particularly around the announcement of the
activist event, but the evidence is more mixed where longer term operating
performance of the company is evaluated post hedge fund activism.12
There is also some recent empirical evidence suggesting that hedge fund
activism, at least as of 2007, is able to achieve not only its investment
objective of profiting from shareholder activism, but also provides a form
of discipline, especially against the agency problems associated with free
cash flow, and creates improved long–term performance.13 As for the
alleged “dark–side” of hedge fund activism, empirical evidence suggests
that “activist hedge funds are not short–term in focus”; they “do not often
use equity decoupling techniques”; “they seldom seek control”; and, in
most cases, they “are not mainly hostile to incumbent management.”14
Taken together, the existing empirical literature coheres with views
expressed by academic proponents of the promising corporate governance
role of activist hedge funds.15 Whether activist hedge funds will continue
12. See generally Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 FOUNDS. &
TRENDS FIN. 185 (2009) (examining hedge fund activism in the United States between 2001
and 2006 and analyzing its possible value); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Impact
of Hedge Fund Activism: Evidence and Implications (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. (ECGI),
Law Working Paper No. 266/2014) (providing an excellent review of the empirical literature
on hedge fund activism). For post-crisis hedge fund activism, see CNV Krishnan et al., Top
Hedge Funds and Shareholder Activism (Vanderbilt Univ. Law School, Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 9/2015, 2015) (examining activist hedge fund campaigns in the United
States between 2008 and mid-2014, and finding that activist hedge funds, especially those
involved in the largest interventions in terms of aggregate market capitalization, generate
positive announcement-period abnormal stock price returns).
13. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long–Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2015) (finding improved operating performance of
companies following activist interventions).
14. Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some
Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 459, 460 (2013).
15. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 248, 272 (2008) (arguing that activist hedge funds together with private equity
funds are increasingly seen as “the great, shining beacon of hope on an otherwise bleak
landscape” which can “fill the governance gap created by the passive credit-rating agencies,
the moribund market for corporate control, the rational ignorance in shareholder voting, and
the captured directors and self-interested management”); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1730, 1774
(2008) (perceiving activist hedge funds as “informed monitors” and describing hedge fund
activism as “a new middle ground between internal monitoring by large shareholders and
external monitoring by corporate raiders”); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds
in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1047 (2007)
(hoping that activist “hedge funds may act ‘like real owners’ and provide a check on
management discretion”); Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a
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to deliver on their promise to provide more disciplined monitoring of
management remains to be seen, but there is a growing consensus that
activist hedge funds are here to stay. Therefore, understanding the
underpinnings of hedge fund activism is crucial.
The ways in which activist hedge funds employ their monitoring
activities are surely a function of market variables. For instance, empirical
evidence shows that the performance, size, and ownership structure of the
target company are important factors that can influence an activist hedge
fund campaign.16 An additional market consideration is the market depth—
in other words, the liquidity of shares in the particular market—which
enables an activist hedge fund to profit by acquiring a significant stake in a
target firm without a significant price impact.17 Although market factors
are of critical importance to the emergence and development of an activist
campaign aimed at a company, the effort required to begin engaging with
specific companies in any particular country implies that there will need to
be a generally attractive institutional legal framework before activist hedge
funds begin their firm–specific research.
To the best of my knowledge, this Article is the first to systematically
examine whether “law” is conducive to an activist hedge fund campaign.18

Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance, 2014 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2015),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2324151 (suggesting hedge fund activism may act as a
corrective mechanism in corporate governance).
16. See infra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
17. Previous economic literature shows that deep markets—markets with a fair amount
of liquidity (non–speculative) trading—facilitate outside investors in concealing their trades
behind liquidity trading and building up a sizeable share with profit. See Ernst Maug, Large
Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade–Off between Liquidity and Control?, 53 J. FIN.
65 (1998) (finding liquid stock markets increase effectiveness of corporate governance);
Thomas H. Noe, Investor Activism and Financial Market Structure, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 289,
308 (2002) (showing that increasing liquidity always increases firm value, even in the case
of investors with no toehold stake); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large
Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461, 475–76 (1986) (examining pretakeover trading by large shareholder and showing that a large shareholder can assemble a
large block shares only if there is a scope of anonymous trading). For the impact of firm
liquidity on mainstream shareholder activism, see Oyvind Norli et al., Liquidity and
Shareholder Activism, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 486 (2015) (using a hand-collected sample of
contested proxy solicitations and shareholder proposals as occurrences of shareholder
activism in the United States and determining that stock liquidity improves shareholders’
incentives to monitor management). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control:
The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991)
(suggesting that liquidity discourages shareholder activism); Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs
of Stock Market Liquidity, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 31 (1993). In the context of hedge fund
activism, see Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1754 (finding that target firms exhibit higher
trading liquidity than comparable firms in their sample).
18. The question of law’s relation to hedge fund activism largely depends on how law
is defined for the purposes of analysis. Two important caveats need to be made in this
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In taking up this challenge, it pioneers a new approach of understanding the
brand of shareholder activism associated with activist hedge funds,
describing an activist hedge fund’s campaign as a sequence of four stages:
an activist hedge fund manager first selects a target company that presents
high-value opportunities for engagement (entry stage); it accumulates a
nontrivial stake (trading stage); it then determines and employs its activist
strategy (disciplining stage); and, finally, it exits (exit stage).19 While the
entry and trading stages will also be present in other forms of value
investing, the readiness to take a hands-on role and lobby for changes
(disciplining stage) is the crucial additional dimension to hedge fund
activism. Breaking the activist process into a sequence of four stages
allows for a more fine–grained understanding of the legal factors conducive
to an activist hedge fund campaign.
The motivation for this study is the variations of the incidence, nature,
and evolution of worldwide hedge fund activism. As activist hedge funds
in the United States were successful in generating above–market rates of
return for the funds and their investors, they turned to other markets in
Europe and Asia. Where activist hedge funds have spread from the United
States to other markets, they have not emerged as a duplicate of the
American practice; rather there is considerable diversity in the incidence
and magnitude of hedge fund activism around the world. Data that I have
compiled on instances of shareholder activism by hedge funds and
similarly structured collective investment vehicles from 2000 through 2010
in 25 countries—other than the United States—provide a helpful way of
tracking the emergence of hedge fund activism and testing the implications
of cross–country legal differences on the incidence and nature of activist

respect. First, this study only examines the likely impact of corporate and securities laws
which targeted companies are subject to. Therefore, laws governing collective investment
vehicles and their likely impact on hedge fund activism remain out of the scope of this
study. Second, the focus is on formal (substantive) law rather than on legal institutions.
Informal rules, non-legal mechanisms of corporate governance, the company’s own
constitution, or enforcement actions are also crucial to hedge fund activism’s rise and
evolution. Yet, the focus on formal law, and more specifically on shareholder protection
law and disclosure rules, is an attempt to more clearly define the scope of analysis and
harness the power of the previously constructed legal indices that are used in the empirical
analysis of Part IV of this Article.
19. For the third stage of an activist hedge fund campaign, I use the term “disciplining”
rather than the more common term “monitoring” because effective oversight requires more
than monitoring incumbent management; it requires doing something about poor
performance. See also Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 453 (1991) (using the term
“discipline,” instead of “monitor,” “to refer to the activities, or alternatively the oversight, of
a sole owner or a large individual owner who is not also a manager”).
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hedge fund campaigns. The resulting data are combined with legal indices
to test which legal rules (if any) matter for hedge fund activism.
The wider purpose of this Article is, on the one hand, to provide a
general understanding of the forces that shape the development of
worldwide hedge fund activism and expand the empirical base for the study
of the relationship between law and areas of economic and corporate
governance activity. On the other hand, this analysis has a normative
dimension. Knowing how the worldwide phenomenon of hedge fund
activism is determined makes it possible to suggest new directions for
policymakers concerned with the role of law in promoting hedge fund
activism and shareholder activism more generally. If, for instance, it were
found that shareholder rights, such as the nomination and election of
directors, matter for the effectiveness of hedge fund activism, advocates of
activist hedge funds would be encouraged to demand empowerment of the
shareholder rights vis–à–vis the incumbents.
However, increasing
shareholder power would be desirable only if activist hedge funds could
operate to improve corporate performance and value. As previous
empirical analysis indicates, hedge fund activism does in fact have such
consequences.20
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the
analytical framework for approaching the relationship between law and
hedge fund activism and introduces an activist hedge fund campaign as a
sequence of four stages. Part I also brings the long line of research on the
relationship between law and economic activity into sharp focus and
examines how the so-called “leximetric”21 coding techniques can be useful
in the study of the legal determinants of worldwide hedge fund activism.
Part II uses the four stages of an activist hedge fund campaign as a
heuristic to identify the legal factors that are most likely to influence the
emergence and evolution of worldwide hedge fund activism. In particular,
Part II suggests that three sets of legal rules, which activist hedge funds’
targets are subject to, critically affect the incidence and magnitude of global
hedge fund activism: mandatory disclosure rules, ownership disclosure
rules, and law protecting shareholder rights. The latter set of rules include
the legal rules governing the leeway activist hedge funds have to utilize
shareholder decision–making procedures to influence corporate policy and
governance, exercise a veto over board initiatives, elect and remove
directors, and bring shareholder–driven litigation.
The next two Parts are empirical in nature. Part III describes the
sample and presents fresh data on the geography and the insurgents of the

20.
21.

See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
See infra note 54 and accompanying text (defining “leximetric” and the technique).
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worldwide hedge fund activism phenomenon. Part IV empirically
investigates the implications of cross–country legal differences on
worldwide activist hedge fund campaigns, drawing upon Part II’s
theoretical assessments. The findings suggest that the extent to which
country–level legal attractions are a determinant of global hedge fund
activism depends on the stage that hedge fund activism has reached. I find
that at the entry stage of an activist campaign, activist hedge funds tend to
target companies incorporated in countries with stronger disclosure and
shareholder regimes. Moreover, examination of the activist ownership
stakes reveals that activist hedge funds tend to amass bigger stakes in
countries with higher ownership thresholds. The evidence, however, shows
that other parameters of the ownership disclosure rules—such as the
breadth of the definition of the stake that triggers the disclosure obligation
and the deadline within which the investors should report to the competent
authorities after crossing the relevant threshold—have somewhat weaker
ramifications for the trading stage of an activist campaign. Finally, the data
on the disciplining stage of an activist hedge fund campaign provide little
indication that the activist objectives and the employed strategies are a
reflection of the shareholder protection regime of the country in which the
target company is located. This might suggest that while a minimum
protection of minority shareholder rights is a necessary condition for the
activist hedge funds’ entry to the activist arena, subsequent choices of the
activist objectives and strategies are, at least in part, endogenous to the
ways in which the legal infrastructure affects hedge fund activism.
The concluding part summarizes and offers avenues for future
empirical investigation of the impact of international regulatory differences
on the incidence and effectiveness of hedge fund activism, and shareholder
activism more generally.
I.

SETTING THE SCENE

A. Hedge Fund Activism: A Four-Stage Analytical Framework
Previous literature identifies several key elements of the brand of
shareholder activism associated with activist hedge funds and illustrates
how it differs from previous forms of shareholder activism by institutional
investors, as well from interventions designed to achieve control of the
targeted companies. Focusing on activism directed at U.S. companies,
Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have thoughtfully explained
that “hedge fund activism is strategic and ex ante [rather than incidental
and ex post]: hedge fund managers first determine whether a company
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would benefit from activism, then take a position and become active.”22
Professors Brian Cheffins and John Armour employ the adjectives
“offensive” and “defensive” to distinguish between shareholder activism by
conventional institutional investors (e.g., mutual funds and pension funds)
and shareholder activism by activist hedge funds.23 The key difference
between these two forms of shareholder activism is the existence (defensive
activism) or not (offensive activism) of a pre–existing stake in the target
company.
However, having an initial endowment in a target company does not
automatically render activism “defensive” in nature.24 In some exceptional
cases, activist hedge funds might already have a small shareholding in a
company before deciding to actively lobby for changes and, thus, hedge
fund activism is not always “ex ante.”25 Also, the term “offensive”
activism implies a confrontational posture; whereas many of the activist
hedge funds are not high–profile activist investors and generally do not
seek publicity.26
This suggests that the style of shareholder activism in which hedge
funds and other shareholder activist funds engage has two defining
features. First, it presupposes an equity stake as the departure point which
is accumulated proactively; that is activist hedge funds either do not have a
pre–existing stake in the target company or they have a small one which
they quickly increase when they decide to adopt a hands–on strategy.
Secondly, it aims to effect change in the policies of the targeted companies
in order to extract value. The distinguishing feature of this brand of
shareholder activism from other forms of engagement with portfolio
companies lies in its proactive nature: activist hedge funds initiate changes
rather than merely reacting to events of underperformance or deficient
management. It is also helpful at this stage to distinguish between activist
interventions and passive acquisitions of shares by otherwise activist funds
(See Figure 1, below). The former—hedge fund activism—can be thought
of as involving a four–pronged strategy approach: entry, trading,

22. Kahan & Rock, supra note 15, at 1069.
23. Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 56 (2011).
24. Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 467.
25. For example, in the TCI’s campaign in J-Power, the Japanese electric power
company: “TCI . . . changed the purpose of its holding in its filing with the Japanese
regulator, from one of ‘pure investment’ to an ‘investment to receive a capital return as a
shareholder and submit important proposals to members of the board or to the annual
shareholders’ meeting as the situation warrants.” Michiyo Nakamoto, TCI Calls on J–Power
to Triple Dividend, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, at 28.
26. For empirical evidence, see infra notes 196–197 and accompanying text.
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disciplining, and exit. The latter involves profitable stock–picking, to
which value investors aspire, without recourse to a hands–on approach.
Figure 1: The four stages of an activist hedge fund campaign

Disciplining
Entry

Trading

Entry

Trading

Disciplining

Exit

Exit

Exit

Exit

A typical activist hedge fund campaign starts with the selection of a
target company that presents high–value opportunities for engagement
(entry stage).
Activist hedge funds search for undervalued and
underperforming companies.27 Choosing a target company that fails to
fulfill its potential and thus likely to deliver better shareholder returns is a
necessary pre–condition for the activist hedge fund’s entry decision. Yet it
is not a sufficient one. Instead, hedge fund activism is intimately linked to
the ownership structure of the target company. A dispersed ownership
structure is more appealing to activist hedge funds at the entry stage of an
activist campaign, whereas the existence of controlling blocks in the target
company constitutes a “structural” barrier to shareholder activism by
activist hedge funds if the controlling shareholders are unwilling to support
the activist campaign.28 A friendly block-holder in the target company
aside, it will be more difficult for a hedge fund to pursue an activist
campaign in a company with shareholders who control a sufficiently large
block of votes to veto unwelcome activists. However, the emerging
patterns of activist hedge fund campaigns in jurisdictions such as Italy,
France, and Germany, where ownership concentration is substantial even in
large publicly-listed companies,29 suggest that an activist hedge fund could
27. See Robin M. Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 32 J.
FIN. ECON. 362, 365 (2009) (finding that about half—47.9% and 45.5%, respectively—of
the activist events in their sample involved hedge funds recognizing that the target company
was undervalued and engaging in management to maximize firm value); Brav et al., supra
note 15, at 1729.
28. See Martin de Sa’Pinto, Laxey–daisical Governance or Saurer Grapes?,
HEDGEWORLDNEWS, Aug. 30, 2006 (mentioning hedge fund’s ability to accumulate 26% of
the target’s shares).
29. For a systematic analysis of ownership in Western Europe, see Mara Faccio &
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buy into a company with concentrated ownership structure in certain
exceptional circumstances.30
After an activist hedge fund identifies a potential target where it
anticipates that feasible changes can increase shareholder returns, it starts
to accumulate its ownership stake (trading stage).31 Activist hedge funds
usually purchase a sizeable stake in the target company through the open
market.32 Previous economic literature shows that, in equilibrium, an
active intervention is only worth the cost when an investor owns a large
stake. This is because the gains that he or she can accrue from the increase
in shareholder returns depend on the size of his or her stake.33 Yet for
investors with no toehold stake in the firm, such as activist hedge funds,
shareholder activism is not monotonically related to the size of
shareholdings.34 Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that sometimes
activist hedge funds intervene even with tiny ownership stakes, while
empirical studies point out that, although hedge fund activism does not

Larry H. P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations, 65 J. FIN.
ECON. 365 (2002) (finding that 54% of European firms have only one controlling owner).
For the ownership structure of East Asian countries, see Stijn Claessens et al., The
Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81
(2000) (finding that more than two-thirds of the firms in their sample were controlled by a
single shareholder).
30. See Matteo Erede, Governing Corporations with Concentrated Ownership
Structure: An Empirical Analysis of Hedge Fund Activism in Italy and Germany, and Its
Evolution, 10 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 328 (2013) (suggesting that activist hedge
funds invest in companies with concentrated ownership when they are able to take
advantage of the several different rights provided by the law and company bylaws for the
protection of minority shareholders, such as the right to elect a director in a company that
mandates board representation for minority shareholders); see also Cheffins & Armour,
supra note 23, at 68 (suggesting that another possibility where hedge fund activism is likely
to be deployed, despite the lack of dispersed ownership, is where there is a special class of
shares upon which the controlling shareholder’s power is based and the activist lobbies for
the company to normalize the share structure).
31. For the purpose of simplicity, I assume here that an activist hedge fund has no preexisting stake. Contra supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
32. For empirical evidence in the United States, see Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M.
Mooradian, Intense Hedge Fund Activists 3, 30 (Feb. 23, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571728 (finding from a total of 272 hedge fund-target
pairs, only 57 funds purchased any of their shares using a method other than an open market
purchase, such as private placement or conversion of preferred stock or debt).
33. See, e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 17, at 468 (arguing that the presence of a
large shareholder is a necessary condition for the occurrence of value-increasing takeovers);
Charles Kahn & Andrew Winton, Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder
Intervention, 53 J. FIN. 99, 109–110 (1998) (showing that, in the case of activists with initial
endowment, larger stakes increase the expected value of the initial shares of the activist and
the activist’s trading profits and, hence, encourage intervention).
34. Noe, supra note 17, at 303, 308.
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generally involve controlling blocks, it does involve large minority blocks
with the median maximum activist blocks being around 10 percent.35
After accumulating a sizeable stake, an activist hedge fund announces
a change in the firm’s corporate policy or governance that it believes is
value-enhancing and then tries to get that change carried out (disciplining
stage). An activist hedge fund does not necessarily formulate a set of
demands for the first time at the disciplining stage; already at the entry
stage, it identifies valuable improvements in the firm’s policy through
independent research, while it assesses various firm–specific parameters
that are likely to influence its entry to a particular target company. At the
disciplining stage, however, an activist makes its investment intents known
to the incumbents either privately via letter writings or meetings, or
publicly through regulatory filings (e.g. 13D filings in the United States) or
press reports. Under this definition, the disciplining stage starts with the
communication of the activist hedge fund’s demands to the target company,
followed by the various tactics an activist hedge fund employs in order to
prod the incumbents to conform to its demands.
The entry and trading stage will be present in stock-picking too. But
the readiness to take a hands–on role and lobby for changes (disciplining
stage) is the crucial additional dimension to hedge fund activism. It is also
noteworthy that even if a hedge fund has an activist reputation, this does
not mean that it engages actively with all the companies in which it invests.
Rather, it is possible that activist hedge funds sometimes buy up shares for
purely investment purposes without prompting any specific changes.36 This
type of investment is what I term as stock–picking and does not qualify as
hedge fund activism.

35. See Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1747 (reporting that the median initial (maximum)
percentage stake that a hedge fund takes in the target is 6.3% (9.5%), but finding that hostile
engagements exhibit larger ownership stakes in target firms); Nicole M. Boyson & Robert
M. Mooradian, Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism, 14 REV. DERIVIATIVES
RES. 169, 177 (2011) (documenting that the mean initial (maximum) percentage ownership
by activist hedge funds in target companies is 8.8% (12.4%)); Greenwood & Schor, supra
note 27, at 362 (reporting a 9.8% average initial ownership in their sample); Katelouzou,
supra note 14, at 490 (reporting that the median minimum and maximum held by activist
hedge funds in her sample is 4.9% and 10%, respectively).
36. For example, Atlantic Investment Management, a New York-based hedge fund,
typically accumulates stocks in undervalued companies, keeps a low profile, and exits at a
profit. In egregious times, however, the fund engages in public disputes. The former
strategy—stock–picking—includes investments in French Groupe Zodiac, German
Rheinmetall, and Italian Prysmian, while the latter one—hedge fund activism—involves
activist campaigns in Japanese Dai Nippon Printing Co and Dutch TNT (data on file with
the author).
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Finally, an activist hedge fund exits in order to realize the gains of its
disciplining activities (exit stage). Empirical research on hedge fund
activism targeting U.S. companies by Professors Alon Brav, Jian Wei,
Frank Partnoy, and Randall Thomas illustrates that activist hedge funds
usually exit through selling in the open market. They found, based on a
sample of 1,049 hedge fund–target pairs between 2001 and 2006, that
selling in the open market is the predominant form of activist hedge funds’
exit, accounting for two–thirds of all completed cases in their sample, while
other indicia of exit include the sale, merger or liquidation of the target
company.37 Lastly, activist hedge funds are not necessarily short–term
investors; rather in the majority of cases the activist holding periods are in
the range of one year or longer.38
B. Theoretical Underpinnings of Law and Economic Activity
Activist hedge funds invest in specific companies rather than whole
markets, but the effort required to start engaging with specific companies in
any particular country implies that there will need to be a generally
attractive institutional legal framework before activist hedge funds begin
their firm–specific research. The idea of a link between systemic legal
factors and shareholder activism traces back to the 1990s when a number of
American scholars identified various regulatory obstacles that discourage
conventional institutional investors, such as pension funds and mutual
funds, from engaging in shareholder activism.39 In the context of hedge–
fund–style activism, Professors Brian Cheffins and John Armour
investigate potential systemic factors by introducing the idea of a “market
for corporate influence” in which activist hedge funds are the main
37. Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1747–79.
38. See Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 479 (reporting that 73.6% of the hedge funds in
her sample remain in the target company for more than one year).
39. In the United States, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case For Increasing Shareholder
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) (arguing that shareholders face legal barriers in the
exercise of their voting rights, and taking a more active stance by proposing specific legal
rules to enhance shareholder empowerment); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of Shareholder
Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990) (explaining that a complex web of legal barriers
and legal risks pose an important impediment to shareholder activism in the United States);
Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
117 (1988) (discussing some of the barriers U.S. federal securities regulation imposes on
shareholder action); Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control
of Public Companies, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 7 (1990) (describing legal barriers which restrict
financial institutions from holding large equity blocks and from networking the small blocks
they do own). Outside the United States, see Paollo Santella et al., Legal Obstacles to
Institutional Investor Activism in the EU and in the US, 23 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 257 (2012)
(identifying several legal obstacles to institutional investor activism in the form of voting).
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practitioners.40 They identify factors that shape the “supply” and “demand”
side of the market for corporate influence and in so doing they explain the
past, present and future level of hedge fund activism in the United States.41
In particular, they suggest that legal rules governing the shareholder rights
are among the factors that shape the “supply” side of the market for
corporate influence, while compulsory disclosure and regulation of
collective investment vehicles have an impact on the “demand” side of this
market.42
The idea that law is essential to hedge fund activism and other
corporate governance arrangements echoes the “law and finance” theme of
scholarship. The relationship between law and economic activity has long
been a subject of considerable debate in economic and legal circles, which
goes back to Max Weber and Friedrich von Hayek.43 In the 1970s, law and
society scholars drew on these theories to conclude that there is a causal
relationship running from law to economic activity impacting national
developmental policies in developing countries.44 In recent years, a group
of prominent financial economists produced a burgeoning empirical
research, known as the “law and finance” literature.45 Professors Raphael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny
were the first to show that a country’s legal tradition determines differences
in economic outcomes, such as patterns of shareholder ownership and stock
market development.46 They promulgated a line of greatly influential
literature, which links various legal rules, such as legal support for
shareholders’ rights, with numerous spheres of economic and noneconomic activity.47
40. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 23, at 61.
41. Id. at 61-75.
42. Id.
43. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
(1968) (asserting that the “rationality” of law in Western countries—that is, its highly
differentiated, consciously constructed, general and universal character—helped explain
why capitalism first arose in Europe); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944)
(suggesting that countries with legal systems based on common law better promote
economic activity than those with civil law systems).
44. See generally Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development?
Evidence from East Asia, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 829, 831–34 (2000) (providing a review of
the law and development scholarship).
45. For a review of the law and finance literature, see Rafael La Porta et al., The
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008); Mathias
Siems & Simon Deakin, Comparative Law and Finance: Past, Present and Future
Research, 166 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 120 (2010).
46. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La
Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997).
47. See, e.g., Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q.J. ECON. 453 (2003) (constructing
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The importance of legal institutions for market activity has also been
underscored by the new institutional economics, from the perspective of
which adequate and effective protection and enforcement of property rights
underpin well–functioning markets.48 The quality of enforcement has also
been a central consideration in the law and finance literature,49 and its
importance has been emphasized by legal scholars who suggest that the
impact of the legal system depends not only on substantive rules governing
investor protection (law on the books), but also on procedural rules and
regulators’ enforcement capabilities (law in action).50
Contemporary research on comparative corporate governance also
embraces the idea that law plays a role in corporate governance—an idea
that stems from the agency theory.51 Under agency theory, corporate law
fulfils a functionalist role in constraining the agency costs arising from
conflicts between the shareholders (principals) and the managers (agents).52
an index of the efficiency of court proceedings and finding that procedural formalism in
dispute resolution is higher in civil law countries than in common law countries); Simeon
Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2002) (examining the regulation
of entry of start-up companies in 85 countries); Rafael La Porta et al., Agency Problems and
Dividend Policies Around the World, 55 J. FIN. 1 (2000) (shedding light on payout across 33
countries and finding that stronger shareholder rights are associated with higher dividend
payouts). However, the alleged one-way relation from law (cause) to economic activity
(effect) promulgated by the law and finance literature was challenged by many legal
scholars, who provided alternative hypotheses on the institutional determinants of economic
activity. See, e.g., CURTIS MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT
CORPORATE LAW CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AROUND THE WORLD? (2008) (viewing the relation between law and market activity as a
dynamic one, referring to the degree of centralization of a legal system, and describing the
functions that law plays in support of market activity and the political economy of law
production as reasons why the legal systems differ to each other); Katharina Pistor, Legal
Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market Economies, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
IN CONTEXT: CORPORATIONS, STATES AND MARKETS IN EUROPE, JAPAN AND THE U.S. (Klaus
Hopt et al. eds., 2005) (suggesting that differences across legal systems largely correspond
to the differences between liberal and coordinated market economies); Mark Roe, Political
Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539
(2000) (emphasizing the centrality of politics to financial market development).
48. See generally John N. Drobak, Law & the New Institutional Economics, 26 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2008); Douglass North, Institutions, Ideology, and Economic
Performance, 11 CATO J. 477 (1991).
49. See, e.g., La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 46, at 1140–45.
50. See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the
Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003); Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of
Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 791 (2003).
51. On the theoretical underpinnings of the “law matters” thesis, see Alessio M.
Pacces, How Does Corporate Law Matter?: ‘Law and Finance’ and Beyond, in DOES LAW
MATTER? ON LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (Michael Faure and Jan Smits eds., 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260340.
52. This view reflects many dispersed ownership systems, such as the United Kingdom
and the United States, but it overlooks the role of other stakeholders and is less suitable to
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Methodological advances, such as legal indices that code legal rules,
are making it possible to study how, and which, law matters for economic
outcomes. The first of these indices—the anti-director rights index—has
proved provocative in many ways and was widely used as a measure of
shareholder protection, but at the same time it has been widely criticized
for coding errors and inacurracies in certain values, to name just but a few
of its defects.53 Instead, the so-called “leximetric” analysis of legal data
provides a theoretically and empirically more grounded approach in
exploring the variation across legal and regulatory regimes of different
countries and across time.54
Overall, in the last two decades the effect of law on economic activity
has been resurged by the law and finance scholarship and has been
captured—statistically, at least—by legal indices and econometric analysis.
This testing, by way of quantification, is not limited to law and finance, but
it can assist other types of corporate governance research. This topic is
deferred until Part IV, where legal indices are used to capture whether law
is facilitative of hedge fund activism and some preliminary empirical
results are presented and discussed. But, let us first conceptualize the legal
settings of hedge fund activism in the next Part.

other legal systems, such as Germany, which deviate from an exclusive focus on
shareholders. See Ruth V. Aguilera & Gregory Jackson, The Cross-National Diversity of
Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 477 (2003).
An alternative view is to see the corporation not only as a legal, but also as a social
institution. See John Buchanan et al., Empirical Analysis of Legal Institutions and
Institutional Change: Multiple-Methods Approaches and Their Application to Corporate
Governance Research, 10 J. INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 1 (2014).
53. The anti-director rights index (ADRI) was developed by a group of four financial
economists and contained six variables (“proxy mail allowed,” “shares not blocked before
the meeting,” “cumulative voting,” “oppressed minority,” “pre-emptive rights to new
shares,” and “percentage of share capital to call a special shareholder meeting”) that were
intended to capture how strongly the legal system of a country favors minority shareholder
protection against the board of directors and managers. On the ADRI, see La Porta et al.,
Law & Finance, supra note 46, at 1126–34. For an overview of the shortcomings of the
ADRI and a comparison with alternative leximetric indices, see Dionysia Katelouzou, A
Leximetric Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: The Case of Hedge Fund
Activism, 9 J. COMP. L. 43 (2015).
54. See, e.g., Priya P. Lele & Mathias Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric
Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 17 (2007) (borrowing the term “leximetrics” from Robert D.
Cooter and Tom Ginsburg, Leximetrics: Why the Same Laws are Longer in Some Countries
than Others (Univ. Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. LE03-012, 2003), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=456520).
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LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM AND
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

This Part examines whether and how law is facilitative of hedge fund
activism. The analysis provided here does not aim to be a comprehensive
comparison of corporate law across different jurisdictions. Instead, it
draws upon Part I’s four-stage analytical framework of hedge fund activism
and investigates which legal variables are likely to make a greater
contribution to the different stages of an activist hedge fund campaign. To
make this idea compelling, however, particular national corporate laws
must be addressed. In the course of the analysis in this Part, therefore, I
provide examples from different jurisdictions as to how corporate law
variables are critical for the emergence of hedge fund activism. Future
research could extend this analysis into full–fledged comparisons of the
legal parameters affecting hedge fund activism across different regulatory
regimes. Let’s now turn to how corporate law supports the first stage of an
activist hedge fund campaign.
A. The Entry Stage: The Role of Mandatory Disclosure
We have seen above that at the first stage of an activist campaign—the
entry stage—activist hedge funds need to identify a potential target
company that presents high value opportunities for engagement.55 In
selecting a target company, an activist hedge fund must assess what the
company would be worth following its activist engagement. This
assessment requires extensive information on the financial statements and
governance arrangements of the target company and incurs high costs if the
information is not made freely available.56 Also, when up–to–date,
accurate, and relevant information about a potential target is available to
the market, less unsystematic risk will be involved in the activist’s
assessment of whether its entry to a company is worth pursuing, and less
expected gain will be necessary to motivate an activist hedge fund to
undertake an activist campaign.57
55. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
56. At the entry stage, an activist hedge fund faces the costs associated with collecting
information, identifying the potential candidate target, and assessing the value of the target
company and the risks associated with the activist engagement (search costs). On the costs
of an activist hedge fund campaign, see Cheffins & Armour, supra note 23, at 62–64.
57. Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, 120–21 (1999) (making a similar point for the way mandatory
disclosure influences the potential bidders in the market for corporate control); Merritt B.
Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH.
L. REV. 2498, 2547–48 (1997).
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Mandatory disclosure requirements imposed on publicly-listed
companies have, therefore, a role to play at the entry stage of an activist
campaign. Although information disclosure operates independently of
activist hedge fund campaigns, financial reporting via annual accounts and
periodic reports can help the activists’ target selection by providing a
comprehensive picture of the target’s performance and enabling the
insurgents to form a better judgment of the value of the firm, its securities,
and its future prospects.58 For example, mandated forward–looking
financial information might help an activist to assess the expected return on
its investment.59 In addition to its impact on the entry stage of an activist
campaign, periodic financial reporting can also help an activist hedge fund
in the exercise of its governance powers at the disciplining stage of an
activist campaign because it enhances the accountability for and the
transparency of the target company.60
Mandatory disclosure can also serve to reduce agency losses that arise
from information asymmetries between insiders (e.g., directors and
managers) and outside activist hedge funds, as the latter are likely to be
much less well–informed than the insiders with regard to the operating
performance or the governance arrangements of the target company, for
example.61 Suitable tailored disclosure requirements, such as disclosure of
58. For a comparison of the mandatory disclosure regimes across six countries (France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States), see Gerard Hertig et al.,
Issuers and Investor Protection, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 281–89 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2009). Most countries
also have a set of mandatory disclosure requirements at the initial offering stage. However,
for activist hedge funds, initial public offering disclosure is likely to be of minimal
importance, since they usually buy common stock on the open market and rarely invest in
initial public offers (IPOs) of securities. For empirical evidence suggesting that IPOs are
not a popular method for activists to invest, see Boyson & Mooradian, supra note 32, at 30
(reporting that activist hedge funds in the United States accumulate common stock through
IPOs in just 13 out of 457 cases in their sample).
59. Contra Hertig et al., supra note 58, at 284 (suggesting that projective data account
for only a tiny fraction of mandatory disclosure across jurisdictions).
60. For the dual objective of disclosure rules at the E.U. level (protection of investors
and protection of shareholders), see THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS,
REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS ON A MODERN REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR A COMPANY LAW IN EUROPE 33-34 (2002).
61. See generally Fox, Required Disclosure, supra note 57, at 118–19; Merritt B. Fox,
Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 258 (2009); Paul G.
Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1047 (1995) (introducing the “agency cost model” as an alternative efficiency justification
for mandatory disclosure in securities markets and suggesting that the principal purpose of
mandatory disclosure is not to enhance price accuracy, but rather to address certain agency
problems that arise between corporate promoters and investors, and between corporate
managers and shareholders).
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executive compensation and self–dealing,62 can provide useful benchmarks
that might help activist hedge funds evaluate potential agency conflicts and
uncover companies requiring corporate governance improvements.
Indeed, in the course of their activist campaigns, hedge funds often
criticize the targets of their activism for poor disclosure practices. Such
attempts are usually an adjunct to broader activism focusing on corporate
governance or capital changes—such as when Pirate Capital, a
Connecticut–based hedge fund, put pressure on Intrawest to provide more
thorough disclosures disclosure to investors as part of its broader attempt to
push for a share buyback,63 or when Elliott Associates L.P. criticized Hess
Corp. for opaque disclosure, among other corporate governance failures,
and filed a proxy statement nominating five members to the Hess board.64
B. The Trading Stage: Ownership Disclosure Rules
Following the entry stage of an activist campaign, an activist hedge
fund starts to build its ownership stake.65 In addition to the impact of target
firm liquidity on the profitability of activist trading,66 rules requiring large
shareholders to disclose their holdings can further impair the trading
benefits, and, hence, deter hedge funds from proactive stake–building.
The focus of this Section is on the impact of four different aspects of
ownership disclosure on the trading stage of hedge fund activism: (1) the
initial triggering threshold percentage for disclosure; (2) the breadth of the
definition of the stake that triggers the disclosure; (3) the deadline within
which the activist(s) should report to the competent authorities after
crossing the relevant threshold; and (4) the scope of the disclosure
obligation, while it also considers the effect of acting–in–concert
legislation on the ability of activist hedge funds to amass a sizeable stake.

62. See, e.g., Luca Enriques et al., Related-Party Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 158 (Reinier Kraakman et
al. eds., 2009) (analyzing the differences in disclosure of managerial compensation across
five countries).
63. Lori McLeod, Intrawest Pushed for Share Buyback: Evaluating Its Options, NAT’L
POST, Oct. 6, 2005, at 12 (describing how Pirate Capital pressed Intrawest for a share
buyback).
64. Hess Corp., Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 (Schedule 14A) (Apr. 4, 2013) (filed by Elliott Associates, L.P. et
al.).
65. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text (describing the share acquisition
process at the trading stage in detail).
66. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting that activists may acquire
relatively large blocks of liquid shares trading in “deep markets” with little impact on share
price).
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1. Initial Ownership Thresholds
Most jurisdictions now have rules requiring investors to disclose their
holdings whenever they cross some specified thresholds. In the United
States, section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter
“Exchange Act”) and the related Securities and Exchange Commission’s
(SEC) rules require disclosure of transactions that result in anyone
becoming the beneficial owner of more than 5 percent of a public
company’s stock.67 In the European Union, the Transparency Directive68
requires disclosure about major shareholdings where the proportion of
voting rights reaches, exceeds, or falls below eight triggering thresholds
ranging between 5 and 75 percent.69 E.U. Member States remain free to
adopt further thresholds, including lower ones, such as a 3 percent
threshold in the United Kingdom or a 2 percent threshold in Italy.70
While enhanced transparency resulting from lower thresholds may
facilitate the entry stage of an activist hedge fund campaign by giving the
insurgent a clearer picture of the ownership structure of the target company,

67. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d–1(a) (2015). Certain types of investors who invest passively
can instead file a more abbreviated Schedule 13G form. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d–1(b) (2015).
In addition, disclosure may also be required under Section 13(f) of the Exchange Act, while
all institutional investment managers must report their shareholdings quarterly on Form 13F.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13f–1 (2015).
68. Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
December 2004 on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to
Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated
Market and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 [hereinafter
“Transparency Directive”] (amended by Council Directive 2013/50/EU, 2013 O.J. (L 294)
13).
69. The relevant thresholds are at 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50% and 75%. Id.
art. 9, at 47.
70. It also noteworthy that in several countries, like France and Italy, public companies
can set lower thresholds for notification of major shareholdings in their own articles of
association. The law may specify the lowest threshold, as in France, for example, where it
can be set at 0.5%. See Commission Report on More Stringent National Measures
Concerning Directive 2004/109/EC on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in
Relation to Information about Issuers whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a
Regulated Market, at 26, SEC (2008) 3033 final (Dec. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Commission
Report on Transparency Directive] (citing the French threshold and noting that Belgium
specifies 1% as the lowest threshold). In recent years, several E.U. Member States have
lowered the initial disclosure threshold from 5% to 3% or 2%, generating a policy debate on
setting a lower initial disclosure threshold at 3% at the E.U. level. See Commission Staff
Working Document, The Review of the Operation of Directive 2004/109/EC: Emerging
Issues, at 14 & Annex 8, SEC (2009) 611 (May 27, 2010) (describing the lowering of the
initial Directive threshold in some E.U. Member States and noting that the European
Parliament and some experts are in favor of a 3% threshold).
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lower initial thresholds may act as a brake on the activist’s stake–building.
When activists buy shares in the open market, the share price of the target
company increases, but they can hide their presence so that it is profitable
to them to buy shares.71 However, the possibility of secret trading is
restricted as there is an upper limit upon which an activist hedge fund must
declare the amount of shares it owns to comply with ownership disclosure
rules.72 The maximum size of the ownership stake an activist hedge fund
can purchase anonymously without disclosure, therefore, puts an upper
limit to the benefits it can earn from an activist campaign, since the
activist’s post-disclosure gains must in effect be shared with the market.
In addition to its negative impact on activist trading, mandatory
ownership disclosure can serve as an initial warning to the target’s
management, but may also signal other investors to enter the target
company. A relevant high initial threshold enables an activist hedge fund
to conceal its presence from the incumbents, who may be unable to judge
whether the activist has voting power in the company. Adding to its
limiting impact is the fact that ownership disclosure can also enable the
target’s management to respond to the activist threat, for example, by
mounting defensive measures.73 As a result, an activist hedge fund is
expected to build a stake in a target company as discretely as possible,
71. Empirical studies in the United States show that 13D filings by activist hedge funds
are associated with significant price effects. See, e.g., April Klein & Emanuel Zur,
Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. FIN.
187 (2009) (finding that target share price tends to increase around the date of the initial
Schedule 13D filing and positive returns continue in the subsequent year for activist hedge
funds and other private investors).
72. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 23, at 64 (defining the percentage of shares
owned as an upper limit on the benefits that an activist shareholder may capture and noting
that the increase in share price that occurs when an activist shareholder’s stake is made
public is an additional constraint).
73. A recent example is Hologic Inc., a U.S. diagnostics and surgical products maker
that adopted a one-year shareholder rights plan (exercisable if a person or group acquired
10% or more of the company’s common stock) after activist investor Carl Icahn unveiled his
12.63% stake in the firm. See Joseph Walker & Tess Stynes, Icahn Takes Stake in Hologic,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304337
404579211802051987232 (detailing Hologic’s decision to adopt a poison pill in response to
Icahn’s disclosure of his holding). The potential role of poison pills as a defense against
shareholder activists in the United States has recently been advanced by the Delaware Court
of Chancery’s decision to uphold the Sotheby’s poison pill, which was challenged by Daniel
Loeb’s Third Point. Third Point LLC v. William F. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL
1922029, at *6–10 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/opinions/
download.aspx?ID=205180 (citing evidence suggesting that Third Point intended to take the
firm private for authorization of poison pill). For a discussion of this decision, see John C.
Coffee, Hedge Fund Activism: New Myths and Old Realities, 251 N.Y. L.J. 5 (2014)
(theorizing that the poison pill is “losing its blocking power” and recommending the
shortening of the ten-day reporting window under Section 13(d)).
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primarily to avoid the burden associated with notification of major
shareholdings, but also for reasons of anonymity. For this type of investor,
the higher the disclosure threshold the better, because a higher threshold
will increase the proportion of the benefits the potential activist can expect
to capture if it chooses to amass an ownership stake in a company and
engage in monitoring activities.
2. The Definition of the Stake that Triggers Disclosure and “Hidden
Ownership”
In addition to the threshold percentage for disclosure, the breadth of
the definition of the ownership stake that triggers disclosure is likely to
matter for the trading stage of an activist hedge fund campaign. Until
recently, disclosure requirements—in European countries as well as in the
United States—were triggered by shareholdings carrying voting rights,
rather than economic positions that do not carry voting rights. However,
financial derivatives and other synthetic transactions have increasingly
enabled investors to separate the economic risk of owning shares of a
public company from the ability to vote those shares, a phenomenon which
has been coined as “hidden ownership.”74 In the context of hedge fund
activism, hidden ownership can be used in order to circumvent disclosure
requirements and stealthily acquire sizeable ownership stakes without
alerting the market. While stake–building through hidden ownership can
reduce the acquisition costs and increase the amount of benefits that can be
internalized by an activist hedge fund, it might distort corporate governance
by keeping the activist’s intents unknown from the incumbents.75

74. The concept of hidden (morphable) ownership has been developed by Professors
Henry T.C. Hu and Bernard Black in several related articles. See generally Henry T.C. Hu
& Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)
Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811 (2006) (establishing the notion of “new vote buying” as
the decoupling of economic ownership of shares from voting rights); Henry T.C. Hu &
Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and
Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008) (expanding upon Hu and Black’s earlier work on
morphable ownership and promoting a disclosure-based response to related problems).
75. See Eugenio de Nardis & Matteo Tonello, Know Your Shareholders: The Use of
Cash-Settled Equity Derivatives to Hide Corporate Ownership Interests, DIRECTOR NOTES:
THE EUR. SERIES (The Conference Bd., New York, N.Y.), July 2010, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1648526 (enumerating various market and corporate governance
distortive effects of hidden ownership). But see Soumyadri Chattopadhyaya, The
Effectiveness of Being Invisible: Hedge Funds, Hidden Ownership and Corporate
Governance, 8 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 305 (2011) (underscoring the benefits of hidden
ownership for activist hedge funds and arguing against mandatory disclosure of economiconly ownership).
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In response to a debate sparked by publicized cases of undisclosed
stake–building (not only by activist hedge funds), regulators in several
European countries have imposed both general disclosure and takeover–
specific disclosure to limit the phenomena of hidden ownership in the last
several years.76 On the other side of the Atlantic, however, the 13D
requirements do not seem to directly capture hidden ownership.77 Yet the
impact on hedge fund activism of any expansion of the disclosure
requirements to include financial derivatives ultimately depends on the
incidence of undisclosed activist stake–building. Although any data are
surely partial given that hidden ownership is not mandatorily disclosed
with the exception of some recent regulatory changes, the available
empirical findings suggest that activist hedge funds do not resort to hidden
ownership as often as their opponents claim.78 Correspondingly, the impact
76. For example, in 2009, the U.K. ownership disclosure rules were amended to
require investors to disclose all major long positions, in respect of any financial instrument
(either physical or cash-settled) they hold directly or indirectly, with financial instruments
being defined broadly to include transferable securities, options, futures, swaps, forward rate
agreements, and any other derivative contracts. See FSA HANDBOOK, §§ 5.3.1-5.3.2 (2015)
[hereinafter “U.K. Disclosure and Transparency Rules” or “DTR”] (imposing broad
disclosure requirements on U.K. listed firms). France, Germany, and Switzerland have also
expanded their disclosure regimes to address issues arising from hidden ownership. See
generally Maiju Kettunen & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Disclosure Regulation of Cash-Settled
Equity Derivatives: An Intentions-Based Approach, 2 LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 227, 238
(2012) (calling the United Kingdom a “forerunner[] in preventing [cash-settled equity
derivative] abuse” and noting that France, Germany, and Switzerland have followed suit).
77. Rule 13d-3(a) of the Exchange Act provides that a beneficial owner is any person
who directly or indirectly has voting power or investment power over the security, while
beneficial ownership of shares also includes “the right to acquire beneficial ownership . . .
within sixty days, including . . . [t]hrough the exercise of any option [or] warrant.” 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a), (d)(1)(i) (2014).
It is also noteworthy that the litigation battle arising in 2008 between the CSX
Corporation and two activist hedge funds, The Children’s Investment Fund Management
(TCI) and 3G Capital Partners, gave no clear answer regarding the disclosure requirements
of hidden ownership. The two activist hedge funds circumvented the disclosure
requirements under Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act through cash-settled total return
equity swaps and sought to wage a proxy contest over the U.S. railroad company. On
appeal, the Second Circuit did not reach any agreement concerning whether and under what
circumstances the long party to a cash-settled total return swap will be deemed to
beneficially own shares for the purposes of Section 13(d). See CSX Corp. v. The Children’s
Inv. Fund Mgmt., 654 F.3d 276, 281–82 (2d Cir. 2011) (identifying the disagreement
regarding beneficial ownership and limiting the majority opinion to the issue of group
formation). However, Judge Winter, in a lengthy concurring opinion, discussed this issue in
some depth. His view was that, without an agreement between the long and short parties
permitting the long party to acquire or vote the counterparty’s hedge position, cash-settled
total return swaps do not render the long party a beneficial owner with a potential disclosure
obligation under Section 13(d). Id. at 288–89 (Winter, J. concurring).
78. See Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling, supra note 74, at 659–81 (studying
42 known or rumored instances of hidden ownership worldwide, though not necessarily as a
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of an extended disclosure regime catching economic ownership on hedge
fund activism is unlikely to be dramatic.
3. Time Window of Disclosure Obligations
The deadline within which the investors should report to the
competent authorities after crossing the ownership thresholds for
notification might also affect the profitability of activist trading.79 As the
reporting deadline becomes more stringent, there is less scope for secret
trading and, in turn, it is more costly for activist hedge funds to accumulate
a sizeable stake. If an activist is forced to disclose its shareholding in the
target too soon, its toehold and its ensuing profit will be smaller and hedge
fund activity will be consequently reduced. In addition, a short time
window for ownership disclosure may serve to increase the time available
to the incumbents to prepare the defensive steps permitted.
Indeed, empirical evidence on both sides of the Atlantic confirms that
activist hedge funds often hide their investments as long as possible. A
part of an activist hedge funds campaign); Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 498 (collecting data
on the publicly-reported instances of decoupling of economic and voting ownership outside
the United States and reporting that activist hedge funds have used hidden ownership
techniques to enforce their activist role in 13 out of 432 activist campaigns studied).
79. In the United States, the 13D Schedule must be filed within 10 days of passing the
5% holding. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2014). Since 2010, corporate directors and their
advocates have lobbied the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to shorten the
disclosure time-window from ten days to only one, aiming at shrinking the share blocks that
activist investors can acquire. See Letter from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Elizabeth
M. Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 7, 2011), available at
www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf (requesting that the SEC shall “propose
amendments to shorten the reporting deadline and expand the definition of beneficial
ownership under the reporting rules”). However, the SEC has yet to take action on this
matter. See Liz Hoffman, SEC Unlikely to Touch 13(D) Stock-Buying Window, WALL ST. J.
MONEYBEAT (Oct. 2, 2014, 4:55 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/10/02/secunlikely-to-touch-13d-stock-buying-window/ (reporting that SEC Commissioner Daniel
Gallagher said the “agency is unlikely to move anytime soon to tighten” the disclosure time
window).
In the European Union, the Transparency Directive sets a stricter deadline, as the acquirer
should notify the issuer as soon as possible after reaching the threshold, but no later than
four days. Transparency Directive, supra note 68, art. 12, § 2, at 48. The Transparency
Directive also imposes a subsequent time window of three trading days within which the
target company must announce the acquisition to the public. Id. at art. 12, § 6, at 48.
Several E.U. Member States have imposed even shorter deadlines for investors’
announcement on major holdings. For example, in the United Kingdom, U.K. acquirers
shall be disclosed to the company and the U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA) within
no later than two trading days. See DTR, supra note 76, § 5.8.3 (setting the deadline for
non-U.K. issuers at four trading days and the deadline for all other issuers at two trading
days).
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recent study of Schedule 13D filings by activist hedge funds between 1994
and 2007 in the United States found that it is common for activist hedge
funds to use the opportunity not to disclose immediately upon crossing the
5% threshold.80 However, the same study did not find evidence that
activists who make full use of the ten–day period prior to disclosure
accumulate larger stakes than those who disclose more quickly after
crossing the 5% threshold.81 A study on hedge fund activism in Germany
similarly reports that activist hedge funds intentionally delay notifications
in order to facilitate further acquisitions of ownership stakes.82 However,
the authors of this study pointed out that the market reaction is not different
for timely and delayed disclosures and suggested that the disclosure per se
is more important than the time window of disclosure.83
4. Intentions–Related Disclosure
Another aspect of the mandatory ownership disclosure regime that
might affect the trading stage of an activist campaign is whether or not the
activist hedge fund should disclose its intentions when it reports its
holdings. In the United States, investors acquiring more than 5 percent of
any class of securities of a publicly–listed company must file with the SEC
if they have an interest in influencing the management of the company,
with the underlying purpose being to alert other shareholders to a potential
change of control.84 In the European Union, the Transparency Directive is
silent on this issue.85 However, some E.U. Member States impose

80. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors:
Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 10–11 (2013) (reporting that in over 40% of the
public disclosures studied activist hedge funds take advantage of the ten-day window, with
nearly 20% filing on the tenth day).
81. Id. at 12.
82. Peter Weber & Heinz Zimmermann, Hedge Fund Activism and Information
Disclosure: The Case of Germany, 19 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 1017 (2013) (suggesting that the
small risk of getting fined for delayed announcement and the low fines that must be paid
upon conviction may explain the violation of disclosure procedures).
83. Id. at 1048.
84. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2015). In particular, Item 4 of Schedule 13D requires
the filer to disclose any “plans or proposals” he/she has with respect to the target issuer,
which may or will result in, among others, a change in the board of directors, a liquidation, a
merger, a sale of material assets of the issuer, a change of the issuer’s corporate or business
structure, or a change of the issuer’s charter or bylaws. Id.
85. On the content of the disclosure, see Transparency Directive, supra note 68, art. 12,
§ 1, at 48 (identifying four categories of disclosure information); see also Roberta S.
Karmel, Reform of Public Company Disclosure in Europe, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 379,
393–98 (2005) (comparing the disclosure regimes of the E.U. to the U.S. regime).
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additional disclosure obligations for large investors in relation to the
objectives pursued by their investment.86
The extended information duties resulting from intentions–related
disclosure could discourage the brand of shareholder activism associated
with activist hedge funds, since the activist’s underlying strategy at the
trading stage focuses on the acquisition of a toehold shareholding in the
target company. The activist can manage this toehold without revealing the
object of its intended campaign. The counterargument might be that if an
investor with an activist reputation accumulates a sizeable stake in a
company and this is disclosed, everyone knows what is going on without a
declaration of intent. In addition, intentions–related disclosure obligations
may not always be counterproductive for activist hedge funds. Activist
campaigns need publicity: activist hedge funds often make their agenda
public via press releases and engage in a public dialogue with the
incumbent directors, which not only puts further pressure on the target
company but also influences other shareholders. Correspondingly, an
intentions–related disclosure may offer activists the publicity they need in
order to profit from their monitoring activities. Some studies have also
shown that the investment purpose may strongly influence the targets’
stock price reaction,87 and without intentions–related disclosure it might be
86. For example, in France any investor crossing the 10% or 20% threshold of capital
or voting rights must declare the objectives to be pursued in the next 12 months, declaring,
among others, whether he/she is acting alone or jointly and whether he/she envisages
making further acquisitions or acquiring a controlling interest in the company. See Code
Commerce [C. Com.] art. L. 233–7 VII c (Fr.) (mandating intentions-related reporting in
France).
Germany has also recently adopted a new law (the so-called Risk Limitation Act)
according to which investors exceeding the 10% threshold are required to disclose their
objectives. Investors are, in particular, requested to disclose whether the acquisition is for
the purpose of implementing strategic objectives or achieving trading profits, whether they
intend to acquire further voting rights in the following 12 months, whether they intend to
exercise any influence, or whether they seek a material change in the capital structure or
dividend policy of the company. See generally Commission Report on Transparency
Directive, supra note 70, at 28 (identifying the German legislation and similar French
disclosure obligations).
Some jurisdictions employ a further technique and permit the company to trigger a
disclosure obligation in relation to the intentions of the beneficial owners. See, e.g.,
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, Part 22 (U.K.) (permitting public U.K. companies to request
intentions-related disclosures from shareholders who are interested in the company’s shares
or were interested in the company’s shares at any time within three years prior to the
request).
87. See Klein & Zur, supra note 71, at 209-11 (finding that the market reacts more
favorably when the activist hedge fund seeks board representation, buys more stock with the
intention of buying the whole firm, or expresses concern over the corporate governance
practices of the target company).
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more difficult for the market to assess the value of an activist hedge fund
campaign.88
5. Acting–in–Concert Legislation
In addition to ownership disclosure rules, tight rules on acting–in–
concert may introduce an important barrier to the trading stage of an
activist campaign. An activist hedge fund can team up with other managers
(usually hedge funds) and form a “wolf–pack,” where each of the
participants purchases a share of the target’s equity, which is below the
threshold prompting a major shareholder’s disclosure obligation.89 A wolf–
pack allows activist hedge funds to circumvent disclosure rules and to
secretly acquire or build upon sizeable stakes without triggering a strong
upward price adjustment. While not all jurisdictions subject all forms of
cooperation to mandatory disclosure, regulators have generally made the
wolf–pack technique subject to disclosure.90
Before concluding this Section, it is important to note that the
mandatory bid rule, which requires the acquirer to make a tender offer to all
the shareholders once it has accumulated a certain percentage of the

88. See Weber & Zimmermann, supra note 82, at 1020 (discussing German regulations
and disclosure requirements for activist hedge funds).
89. See Dirk A. Zetzsche, Challenging Wolf Packs: Thoughts on Efficient Enforcement
of Shareholder Transparency Rules (Ctr. for Bus. & Corporate Law, Working Paper CBC–
RPS No. 0044/09, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/paper=1428899 (proposing new
shareholder transparency rules to battle secret acquisition strategies).
90. Under U.S. securities regulation, a wolf-pack may account for deemed beneficial
ownership under Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act. Specifically, any two or more activist
funds will be considered as one aggregated filing group if they have agreed to act together
“for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or disposing” of the shares. 17 C.F.R. §
240.13d-5(b) (2014). Shares held via swaps or other financial instruments may also meet
the requirements of an “agree[ment] to act together.” Id. This was the case in CSX v. TCI,
where the court ruled that TCI, which held a large stake of up to 14% indirectly based on
swap agreements, was acting in concert with another hedge fund, 3G, and formed a “group.”
CSX Corp. v. The Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt., 654 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 2011).
Therefore, 3G was required to disclose its collaborative activities. Id.
In Europe, shares held in wolf-packs may meet the percentage tests used in disclosure
rules. For the purposes of the shareholder transparency rules, the notification requirements
apply to cases of an “agreement” which “obliges” to adopt “by concerted exercise of the
voting rights, a lasting common policy towards the management of the issuer in question.”
Transparency Directive, supra note 68, art. 10(a), at 47. Shares held via financial
instruments may also meet the requirements of the acting-in-concert test. Id. art. 13, at 49.
Furthermore, some E.U. Member States, for example Germany and France, have widened
the “acting in concert” situation, which triggers the notification duty under the Transparency
Directive. See Commission Report on Transparency Directive, supra note 70, at 27.
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shares,91 is likely to have an additional impact upon the stake–building of
activist wolf–packs. Although activist hedge funds almost never make
takeover bids and rarely come close to owning stakes large enough to
trigger the mandatory bid rule, a wolf–pack of activist hedge funds which
reaches the mandatory bid threshold may find itself subject to an obligation
to make a general offer.92 In the European Union, the current definition of
acting in concert provided by the Takeover Directive gives wide discretion
to E.U. Member States as to the meaning of control. Discretion is given to
such an extent that it allows E.U. Member States to adopt definitions that
establish limits to concerted shareholder action.93 For example, while
under the U.K. City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, a wolf–pack will
trigger a bid requirement only if the participating activists request a general
meeting to consider a “board control–seeking” resolution or threaten to do
so.94 Other E.U. Member States, like Germany and France, have

91. In the European Union, anyone acquiring control of a listed company is required to
make an offer addressed to all holders of securities for all their holdings at a price at least
equal to the highest price paid in the period preceding the acquisition, unless an exemption
or a discount on price is granted by the supervisory authority. Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Takeover Bids 2004/25, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC)
[hereinafter “Takeover Directive”], art. 5, at 17.
However, the mandatory bid rule is not part of U.S. takeover regulation. For an excellent
account of the differences in takeover regulation between the United Kingdom and the
United States, see John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile
Takeovers, and Why?–The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95
GEO. L.J. 1727 (2007) (discussing the regulatory differences for hostile takeovers between
the United States and the United Kingdom).
92. For details on the particular thresholds across the E.U. Member States, see
Takeover Directive, supra note 91, at Annex 2 (requiring mandatory bids for acquisition of
30% of voting rights in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Finland, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom; and for one-third of the voting rights in
Portugal, Slovakia, Luxemburg and France). It is noteworthy that Denmark and Italy have
recently lowered their mandatory bid thresholds, so that a tender offer needs to be made
once the bidder has accumulated one-third of the company’s equity. See Marc Goergen et
al., Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from Takeover Regulation Reforms In
Europe, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 243, 250, 255 (2005).
93. Takeover Directive, supra note 91, art. 2.1.d, at 15:
[P]ersons acting in concert shall mean natural or legal persons who
cooperate with the offeror or the offeree company on the basis of an
agreement, either express or tacit, either oral or written, aimed either at
acquiring control of the offeree company or at frustrating the successful
outcome of a bid.
94. THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND
MERGERS (THE CODE) Note 2 to Rule 9.1, at 133–4 (11th ed. 2013), available at
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf.
A resolution will be normally classified as “board control seeking” if there is a
“relationship” between the activist shareholders and the proposed directors. Absent a

ARTICLE 3 (KATELOUZOU).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

818

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

6/16/15 11:40 AM

[Vol. 17:3

introduced ambiguous definitions of acting in concert which might
arguably lead to a certain degree of uncertainty and deter activist hedge
funds from concerted action.95
C. The Disciplining Stage: Shareholder Rights
In this Section, the emphasis turns to the impact of the legal
environment on the third stage of an activist campaign—the disciplining
stage. The intensity and effectiveness of the activist hedge funds’ actions
at the disciplining stage depend decisively on what pressure they can bring
to bear as shareholders. However, exercising the rights bestowed on
shareholders by corporate law is not necessarily the typical form of hedge
fund activism.
Activist hedge funds often use behind–the–scenes
negotiations, approach the target management through letters and meetings,
or use the media to publicly articulate their demands.96 All these strategies
involve unilateral decision–making on the part of target management and
do not involve any use of formal shareholder rights on the part of the
activist(s). Yet a shareholder–friendly regulatory framework is likely to
have an indirect impact on behind–the–scenes or public, but informal,
negotiations with the incumbents by giving an activist hedge fund a
powerful negotiation advantage at the private stage. A commentator (in the
United Kingdom) remarked that “[t]he detailed legal rules governing the
holding and conduct of meetings of shareholders can . . . be significant if it
comes to a public fight.”97 In other words, the more shareholder-friendly
the regulatory framework is, and therefore the more likely an activist hedge
fund’s public campaign is to be successful, the more powerful the private
pressure an activist hedge fund can put on a target. The legal rules

relationship, the U.K. Takeover Panel will look at the number of directors to be appointed or
replaced compared with the size of the board. Further, on the meaning of a board-control
seeking resolution, see id.
95. See Santella et al., supra note 39, at 280.
96. For empirical evidence on the strategies employed by activist hedge funds, see
infra notes 196–197 and accompanying text.
More recently, activist investors have used social media to support activist campaigns,
especially in the United States. For instance, Carl Icahn first used Twitter to express his
concern over Dell Inc.’s buyout in 2013, and also made extensive use of Twitter in his proxy
contest for eBay Inc. Reacting to this growing use of social media, the SEC staff issued new
guidance in April 2014 on the use of social media in proxy contests. See, e.g., Social Media
and Proxy Contests, LEGAL MONITOR WORLDWIDE, Jul. 10, 2014 (discussing shareholder
activists’ use of social media); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, COMPLIANCE AND DISCLOSURE
INTERPRETATIONS
OF
SECURITIES
ACT
RULES
(2015),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm.
97. PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 425
(8th ed. 2008).
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determining the activist hedge fund decision-making power is, therefore, of
major importance.
The rest of this Section examines three sets of rules that are likely to
empower the insurgent(s) in constraining the board’s discretion at the
disciplining stage of an activist hedge fund campaign. The first set of rules
concerns the extent to which activist hedge funds can utilize the
shareholder decision–making procedures to influence the incumbents and
exercise a veto over board initiatives. In challenging the incumbents’
decisions, however, the right to elect the board of directors and, when
necessary, to take remedial action in the form of board dismissals and
election of new directors is by far the most persuasive tool for activist
shareholders.
Finally, activist hedge funds occasionally resort to
shareholder–driven litigation to accelerate an activist campaign. Takeover
rules might also have an impact on the disciplining stage of an activist
campaign; previous empirical studies suggest, however, that activist hedge
funds rarely intend to take control of the target companies with a takeover
bid, for example.98 Therefore, the influence of the takeover rules, if any, on
hedge fund activism, remains out of the scope of this study.
1. Shareholder Decision–making Power
The brand of shareholder activism associated with hedge funds has
serious consequences for the policies of the target company, ranging from
cash payouts to the sale of the target company at a premium following the
activist campaign, and from governance overhauls to direct governance
participation on the target board.99 Although activist hedge funds most
often call for a board decision rather than for a decision of the shareholders
through the general meeting, it is the threat of shareholder intervention that
motivates the board to act.100 Thus, the questions of how legal regimes
facilitate shareholder participation and what formal rights shareholders
have that maximize their influence in general meetings shape the core of
the analysis in this Section.
Modern company laws oblige public companies to organize a general
meeting at least once a year, while special meetings are called when

98. Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1745; Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 493 (reporting
that activist hedge funds seek to launch a takeover bid only in 4.2% and 3.9% of the studied
samples, respectively).
99. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J.
1375, 1405 (2007) (analyzing the effects that hedge funds have on their targets).
100. For empirical evidence, see Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 486 (reporting only 64
formal shareholder proposals out of the 883 activist strategies examined).
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unusual circumstances arise and particular decisions (e.g., merger) need to
be ratified by shareholders.101 When the general shareholder meeting is
convened by the board, the main protection for the shareholders lies in the
information about the agenda made available to them in advance of the
meeting102 and the length of the required notice.103 For example, timely and
detailed information on the precise context of proposals for resolutions may
assist activists in taking an active part in shareholder meetings and voting
down a management resolution.104 However, empirical evidence suggests
that activist hedge funds rarely vote against management proposals unless
an activist campaign is underway.105

101. See, e.g., Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 336–40 (U.K.) (promulgating the
requirements of an annual meeting); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 211 (2001) (requiring annual
shareholder meetings).
102. See, e.g., Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 311, 311A (U.K.), as amended by Article
10 of The Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 2009/1632 (requiring disclosure to
shareholders prior to the annual meeting). In Delaware, an agenda has to be attached only
for cases of special meetings, but the shareholders have the right to inspect corporate
records. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 220, 222(a) (2001). Further, on the shareholder
information rights under U.S. state laws, see FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW
212–21 (West 2nd ed. 2010). In both countries, the annual accounts are sent out along with
the notice of the meeting. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46, §§ 423–436 (U.K.) (requiring
companies to send notice and information of the meeting to shareholders); 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-3(b) (2014) (requiring corporations to disclose information to shareholders).
103. See, e.g., Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 307A (U.K.), as amended by Article 9(2)
of The Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 2009/1632 (requiring 21 days’ notice
in the case of an annual general meeting or 14 days’ notice in other cases). In the United
States, the time limit for calling a general meeting is 10 days. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §
222(b) (2001) (promulgating general meeting guidelines). A special procedure requires a
motion to be made under SEC Rule 14a-8, in good time. For ordinary general meetings,
shareholder proposals must be submitted 120 days before proxy statements are sent out. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b) (2014); see also MATHIAS M. SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER
LAW 97 (2008) (examining the differences in the time limits and information about the
agenda in six countries: China, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States).
104. Alternatively, an activist may simply make its views on an item which has already
been on the agenda known to other shareholders in advance of the meeting, thereby hoping
to encourage other shareholders to attend the meeting, in person or by proxy, and support
those views. See, e.g., Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Exercise of Certain Rights of Shareholders in Listed Companies, 2007/36, 2007 O.J. (L 184)
17 (EC), art 6, at 21 and Companies Act 2006, c. 46, §§ 314-316 (U.K.) (empowering
shareholders to circulate statements on agenda items). It is unlikely, however, that this
right, if available, can be of any use for activist hedge funds which seek to proactively
influence the incumbents’ strategy and not simply express their opinions to their fellows
shareholders.
105. See Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 486 (reporting that 47 out of the 883 activist
tactics studied included events in which the hedge fund voted down the incumbents’
resolution(s)).
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Rather than voting down a management resolution, activist hedge
funds often seek to add a shareholder proposal to the agenda of a meeting
that the board has already called.106 In such cases, the threshold share
requirement for shareholders to be able to add an item to the agenda, which
is typically 5 percent of the registered capital,107 is likely to matter for an
activist campaign. How easily activist hedge funds can get across the
percentage threshold and add an item to the agenda depends, however, on
the size of the company; activist hedge funds can easily get across the
percentage threshold in small companies, but owning 5 percent in a very
large company takes a serious amount of investment.
Alternative criteria for requiring a resolution to be placed on the
agenda are also sometimes established, such as the 100–member
requirement under the U.K. Companies Act 2006.108 This requirement is
increasingly seen as a viable option for placing shareholder resolutions in
large public companies. In 2002, for instance, Laxey Partners bought 2
percent of British Land stock through 100 nominee accounts and placed
motions on the agenda of the annual general meeting.109 More recently, in
2011, the British hedge fund used a similar tactic in its activist campaign to
reform Alliance Trust, namely it split its 1.3 percent ownership stake in
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 338(3)(a) and 338A(3)(a) (U.K.), as
amended by Article 17 of The Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 2009/1632
(barring shareholders with insufficient equity from proposing agenda items).
However, lower thresholds are found, for instance, in the United States at 1%. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(b)(1) (2014) (allowing a shareholder with a 1% stake to make
proposals). Despite the relevant low threshold for adding an item into the agenda of a
meeting under Rule 14–a8(b) of Regulation 14A, securities regulation associated with the
system of proxy voting has various ramifications for activist hedge funds targeting
American companies. While any shareholder may collect proxies for matters relating to the
general meeting under Rule 14a–7, he/she must bear the costs. By contrast, holders of 1%
of the company’s shares for at least one year may place shareholder proposals on the
company’s proxy statement without incurring any costs under Rule 14a–8. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-8 (2014) (promulgating the right of shareholders to propose agenda items).
108. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 338(3)(b), 338A(3)(b) (U.K.), as amended by
Article 17 of The Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 2009/1632 (support
“[f]rom at least 100 members who have a right to vote at the meeting and hold shares in the
company on which there has been paid up an average sum, per member, of at least £100” is
required). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–8(b)(1) (2014) (allowing shareholder proposals
from those with holdings of at least $2,000 market value).
109. See Norma Cohen, Laxey Throws Down Gauntlet to British Land, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
30, 2002, at 24 (noting the use of the 100-member requirement). In this case, the activist
fund took advantage of section 376 of the previous Companies Act 1985, which similarly
allowed a group of 100 shareholders to place an item on the agenda of a company’s annual
meeting. This right is now found in Companies Act 2006, c. 46, §§ 338(3)(b) and
338A(3)(b) (U.K.).
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Alliance Trust between 100 different nominee accounts and placed
resolutions at the annual general meeting to force a share buyback.110
Similarly, in 2007 the activist fund Efficient Capital Structure bought
0.0004 percent of Vodafone stock, set up 100 nominee accounts in order to
achieve the threshold, and placed a resolution at the company’s annual
general meeting calling for the Vodafone’s holding in Verizon Wireless to
be spun off.111
In addition to the right to add an item to the agenda, the power of
shareholders to call for a special general meeting (calling right), when
available,112 provides an additional weapon to activist hedge funds in
challenging the incumbents. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that
activist hedge funds outside the United States frequently avail themselves
of the calling rights, which are generally linked to a 5 percent ownership
threshold, and request special general meetings, proposing, among others,
the replacement of the target company directors. For instance, Paulson &
Co, a New York–based fund, holding a 19 percent stake in Algoma, one of
Canada’s largest steel-makers, asserted the right provided by Canadian law
to request a special shareholder meeting in November 2005 at which it
proposed the replacement of the majority of the board of directors and a

110. See Miles Costello, Bramson’s Triumph Inspires Laxey to Do the Same; Activist
Investor Demands Reform at Alliance Trust, TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 8, 2011, at 35
(discussing activist shareholders’ use of the 100-member requirement).
111. See Helen Johnson, Shareholder Activism in The Retail Sector, MONTAQ BUS.
BRIEFING, Jul. 16, 2009 (reporting that meeting the 100-members requirement was said to
cost the Efficient Capital Structure £78,500, but accumulating 5% of Vodafone would have
cost £4.1bn); Cassell Bryan-Low & Jason Singer, Agitation at Vodafone Shows Activists
Can Be Small or Big, WALL ST. J., Jun. 8, 2007, at C1.
112. See, e.g., Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 303 (U.K.), as amended by Article 4 of
The Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations 2009/1632:
The directors are required to call a general meeting once the company has
received requests to do so from—(a) members representing at least the required
percentage of such of the paid-up capital of the company as carries the right of
voting at general meetings of the company (excluding any paid-up capital held
as treasury shares); or (b) in the case of a company not having a share capital,
members who represent at least the required percentage of the total voting rights
of all the members having a right to vote at general meetings.
In the United States, however, the board of directors has the power to call special meetings
and shareholder callings rights can be granted only in the charter or bylaws. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8 § 211(d) (2001) (stating “[s]pecial meetings of the stockholders may be called by
the board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of
incorporation or by the bylaws.”). In practice, companies’ charter or bylaws rarely entitle
shareholders to call special meetings. See, e.g., Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in
Corporate Law between the United States and Continental Europe, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697,
732 (2005) (arguing that the absence of a mandatory minimum percentage of share capital to
call an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting in Delaware law makes it more difficult for
shareholders to call an extraordinary meeting).
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cash-payout.113 On the other side of the Atlantic, in the United Kingdom,
activist hedge funds often assert their calling rights provided by the
Companies Act 2006 and call special general meetings. Prominent
examples include the boardroom coup at Wyevale Garden Centers in
December 2005 following a general meeting forced by Laxey Partners, a
British hedge fund with a nearly 29 percent ownership stake in Wyevale;114
and the special general meeting called by JO Hambro, an activist fund,
together with Morley Fund Management and Insight Investment
Management to replace the non-executive chairman of SkyePharma,115
among others.
For the activist hedge fund activity related to shareholder meetings,
what matters is not only what quantitative preconditions have to be set for
passing a resolution of the general meeting in order for it to be binding in
principle on all shareholders or for initiating a special general meeting, but
also what competences the general meeting has in contradistinction to
management.
Routine business decisions generally fall within the
exclusive authority of the board of directors.116 However, shareholders’
meetings have certain powers to initiate resolutions or veto decisions that
fundamentally reallocate power among the firm’s participants. For
instance, activist shareholders targeting British companies can instruct the
board to sell the company or amend the articles of association even if the
incumbents disagree, provided that the issue is properly noticed and is
approved by more than 75 percent of voting shares.117 Of course, even
when the insurgent(s) has the reserve power to direct the board to take, or
113. See Mara Lemos Stein, Canadian Law Makes Activist Plays Easier than in U.S.,
HEDGE FUND TRADES, Dec. 5, 2005.
114. Jenny Davey, Executive Sacked for a Pinch Takes Over as Head of Wyevale, TIMES
(LONDON), Dec. 23, 2005, at 45.
115. Andrew Jack, Rebel Investors in SkyePharma Seek Chairman’s Control, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, at 20.
116. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (2001). See The Companies (Model Articles)
Regulations, 2008, S.I. 2008/3229, Part 2, ¶ 3 (U.K.) [hereinafter “U.K. Model Articles”]
(holding directors responsible for the management of the company’s business).
117. See U.K. Model Articles, supra note 116, Schedule 3, ¶ 4 (describing the
shareholders’ reserve power); Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 314, ¶¶2a to b and § 338, ¶¶3a
to b (U.K.) (stating that companies are required to circulate shareholder statements and
proposed resolutions whenever asked by shareholders representing at least 5% of voting
rights or by 100 shareholders). See also id. § 283 (showing that 75% consent by the
majority is needed for special resolutions to pass).
By contrast, in the United States, shareholders can only veto fundamental changes,
including charter amendments or mergers, after such changes have been proposed by the
board of directors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 242(b)(1) (2001). The code states the rules that
must be followed to make charter amendments, mergers and consolidation, and
(dissolution). Id. §§ 251(c), 275(b).
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refrain from taking, specified action, as is the situation in the United
Kingdom, it is rather uncommon for activist hedge funds to overrule the
board in this way.118 A supermajority vote is hard to come by and, more to
the point, a simple majority is enough in the United Kingdom, as we will
see in the next Section, to remove the board of directors.
2. Appointment and Removal of Directors
A central tenet of an activist hedge fund campaign is the threat or
actual use of the shareholder rights to elect and remove corporate directors.
Empirical evidence from activist hedge fund campaigns on both sides of
the Atlantic indicates that activist hedge funds often channel their
campaigns into battles at the general meeting to replace the target’s board
with the insurgents’ nominees, who would look on the activist demands
more favorably.119
In general, shareholders have the authority to elect and remove
directors. Although the board of directors proposes the company’s slate of
nominees, in most jurisdictions, a qualified minority of shareholders can
contest the board’s slate by placing additional nominees on the agenda of
the shareholders’ meeting.120 Legally–protected board representation for
minority shareholders in countries like Italy might further enhance the

118. See Maggie Urry, Rebels Court Rock Shareholders, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2008, at 21
(describing a rare instance of exercising this right in the case of the joint activist campaign
of SRM Global and RAB Capital in Northern Rock). The two hedge funds, holding more
than 17% of Northern Rock’s shares, requested a special general meeting and placed
resolutions to restrict the board’s ability to issue shares and sell assets without explicit
approval from shareholders. Id.
119. See Klein and Zur, supra note 71, at 213, 215 (finding that a total of 40% of the
hedge fund campaigns involved an actual (12%) or threatened (28%) proxy contest over the
election of directors); Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1743 (finding that activist hedge funds
actually waged proxy fights to gain board representation in 13.2% of the total activist events
in their sample); Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 488 (reporting that in 54 of the 883 activist
tactics studied, the hedge fund used formal voting challenges to the tenure of elected
directors).
120. See U.K. Model Articles, supra note 116, Schedule 3, art. 20 (stipulating the default
rule in the United Kingdom that any shareholder can present his/her own board candidates
in advance of the meeting).
However, in the United States, insurgents must instead solicit their own proxies and
distribute their own solicitations to contest the company’s slate of nominees. Although
federal rules limit proxy access, the bylaws of Delaware corporations may provide for
individuals nominated by a shareholder to be included in the corporate ballot under certain
conditions. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 112 (Supp. 2009). Also, following the 2010
amendments to Rule 14a-8, shareholders are permitted to submit proposals that relate to
nomination or election of a company’s board of directors or procedures for such nomination
or election. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2014).

ARTICLE 3 (KATELOUZOU).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

WORLDWIDE HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM

6/16/15 11:40 AM

825

shareholders’ control over the appointment process.121 Empirical evidence
reveals, however, that activist hedge funds have not yet fully taken
advantage of the legally–protected board representation for minority
shareholders in Italy, and have only rarely nominated minority–appointed
directors for the board of directors and the board of statutory auditors.122
The law can achieve a similar result on a broader scale by mandating
cumulative or proportional voting rules.123 Cumulative voting allows
shareholders to cast all their votes in director elections for a single director.
Cumulative voting generally acts as a safeguard for shareholders by
ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares can elect a
candidate of their choosing to the board, and is seen by corporate
governance reformers and mainstream institutional investors as a
mechanism to improve shareholder representation on boards. However,
although shareholder proposals that require cumulative voting for the
election of directors have been popular among mainstream institutional
investors,124 activist hedge funds have not frequently lobbied for cumulative
voting in the course of their campaigns.125
More often, however, activist hedge funds take advantage of
shareholder-led nomination committees, when available, and actively
engage in the nomination process.126 A prominent example is Cevian
Capital, the largest activist investor in Europe. As part of its activist
agenda, the investment firm secures seats on boards or nomination
committees and plays an active part at the board level.127 Cevian Capital

121. Erede, supra note 30, at 350–53.
122. Id. at 359, 365–67.
123. See generally Enriques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of
Shareholders as a Class, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 91 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2009) (compiling the availability
of cumulative voting across six countries: France, Germany, Japan, Italy, the United
Kingdom, and the United States).
124. See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in
the United States, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 57 (2007) (finding that adopting cumulative
voting has consistently been among the top three shareholder proposals by institutional
investors in the United States).
125. In a rare example of hedge fund activism directed at cumulative voting, Luminus
Management, a New York-based fund holding 8% of Transalta’s shares, put forward four
shareholder proposals relating to the amendment of the articles of association to provide for
cumulative voting. Scott Haggett, TransAlta Says Board to Study Shareholder’s Demands,
REUTERS NEWS (Dec. 17, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/12/17/transaltaluminus-idUSN1739876820071217.
126. See, e.g., Richard Mine, Model Management; Scandinavia, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 21,
2013, at 34 (discussing the availability of nomination shareholder committees in Nordic
countries).
127. Alistair Barr, Cevian Carves Profitable Niche in Europe, MARKETWATCH (Nov.

ARTICLE 3 (KATELOUZOU).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

826

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

6/16/15 11:40 AM

[Vol. 17:3

has taken board representations and agitated for changes at Lindex,
Skandia, Volvo, and Swedbank, to name a few of its targets.128
Some countries further empower the shareholders to remove a director
by a simple majority at any time. For instance, in the United Kingdom, an
activist hedge fund or a group of activists representing at least 5 percent of
the voting share capital can call a special meeting and put forward an
ordinary resolution to remove any or all directors at any time during their
term without cause.129 The removal power exercisable by ordinary majority
can be a powerful inducement to the target company’s directors to follow
the line of action preferred by an activist hedge fund, because if the target
company’s directors choose not to follow the shareholders’ views, they can
be removed by ordinary majority. To put it simply, if the incumbents do
not initiate the changes an activist hedge fund perceives as value–
enhancing, the activist will try to replace the board with one that will make
the changes. Professor Lucian Bebchuk has further suggested that
“because management knows that shareholders have the power to replace
the board, management generally will not neglect shareholder interests to
begin with, and shareholders will not need to exercise their replacement
power.”130 This is why sometimes just the threat that the activist hedge
fund will replace the board is enough to make the incumbents comply with
the activist’s demands.
3. Litigation
So far we have analyzed the opportunities activist hedge funds have to
intervene directly in the management of the company by securing the
passing of resolutions binding the company (governance rights) and by

10, 2010), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/cevian-carves-profitable-niche-in-europe2010-11-19.
128. Charles Fleming, Icahn, Gardell Team Up to Take 4% Stake in Metso, WALL ST. J.,
May 25, 2005, at C4; David Ibison, Boost for Cevian over Volvo Fight, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25,
2006, at 25; Barr, supra note 127.
129. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 168, 303 (U.K.). By contrast, in Delaware, only
directors of a non-staggered board can be removed by shareholders without cause. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(k) (2001). In a non-staggered board, the whole board has a one-year
term and is subject to reelection at each annual general meeting. By contrast, in a staggered
board, only one third of the directors are up for reelection. However, boards are staggered
in the majority of U.S. companies, in which case the default rule of Delaware corporate law
is that the directors can only be removed for cause. Id. See the leading case Ralph
Campbell v Loew’s Inc., 134 A.2d 565 (Del. 1957), which describes what amounts to
“cause.” More importantly, whether the board is staggered or not, shareholders in Delaware
cannot themselves call a special meeting to vote out board members, unless there are
specific provisions in the corporate charter. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
130. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 39, at 851.
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removing members of the board so as to surmount their resistance (removal
rights). In addition to resorting to the governance and removal rights, an
alternative route for an activist hedge fund to implement its objectives is to
threaten or actually pursue litigation on behalf of the company against the
alleged wrongdoing directors (derivative claims).
This strategy is
sometimes an essential part of activist hedge fund campaigns targeting U.S.
companies—as when Cardinal Capital Management filed a derivative
lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duty against the board of directors of
Hollinger International,131 or when activist hedge fund Costa Brava filed
several derivative claims against Telos Corporation.132
However, outside the United States, filing a suit alleging a breach of
fiduciary duties by directors and officers is not a preferable way for activist
hedge funds to put pressure on the incumbents. Consider, for example, the
statutory derivative claim introduced in the United Kingdom by the
Companies Act 2006.133 While the new regime has been envisaged as
“provid[ing] another tool for use by activist shareholders to push for
change at under–performing companies,”134 the incentives for activists to
bring such actions are still weak.135 An activist hedge fund “has little
financial incentive to sue on behalf of the company, because the return to
[the activist] will be, at most, a percentage of the recovery which reflects
the percentage of the shares of the company [the activist] holds.”136
While recourse to derivative litigation is unlikely to be a cost–
effective tactic, activist hedge funds sometimes get involved in legal
disputes with their targets when other activist strategies fail to yield the
desired results. Examples include Implenia, a Swiss construction group,
where Laxey Partners took legal action in an attempt to raise its share of

131. Barbara Shecter, Hollinger Executives Accused of “Diverting Hundreds of
Millions”: Shareholder Lawsuit, NAT’L POST, Jan. 3, 2004, at 1.
132. See Marr Kendra, Telos Prevails After 3 Years of Battling Shareholder, WASH.
POST, Apr. 21, 2008, at D01 (stating that after a lawsuit was filed on behalf of the
shareholder, more than half the board of directors stepped down).
133. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, §§ 260–269 (U.K.).
134. Arad Reisberg, Derivative Claims Under the Companies Act 2006: Much About
Nothing?, in RATIONALITY IN COMPANY LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF D.D. PRENTICE 17
(John Armour & Jennifer Payne eds., 2009) (explaining in depth the new regime of
derivative claims in the United Kingdom and assessing its impact).
135. Compare Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2), (1975) 2 W.L.R. 389 (showing that an
activist hedge fund in the United Kingdom which decides to bring a derivative claim must
not only pay its own legal costs, but also bears the risk of being ordered to pay the defendant
directors’ costs subject to the possibility of gaining indemnity from the company), with
GEVURTZ, supra note 102, at 407–70 (showing that the risk an activist hedge fund runs by
losing the suit is less severe in the United States where contingency fees are available).
136. DAVIES, supra note 97, at 609.
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voting rights and forced Implenia into mediation talks;137 or Stork, a Dutch
industrial group, where hedge funds Centaurus Capital and Paulson Co.
filed a court complaint after Stork issued preference shares to the Stock
Foundation to dilute the activists’ stake ahead of a special meeting called
by the two hedge funds.138
Activist hedge funds also resort to litigation in the context of mergers
& acquisitions as blocking acquirers (trying to block the deal as
shareholders of the potential acquirer) or blocking bidders (trying to block
the deal or improve the terms as shareholders of the potential target).139 For
instance, Paulson Co., a New York activist hedge fund, objected to the 31
Canadian dollars per share bid paid for Deer Creek Energy Ltd. by Total
SA, and launched a court action under so–called dissenter’s rights to seek a
higher price.140 Meanwhile in the Netherlands, a group of minority
shareholders, led by Centaurus Capital Ltd, a British activist hedge fund,
used litigation, along with other tactics, to fight the Swedish Tele2’s offer
for Versatel, the Dutch telecommunications company.141 Finally, activist
hedge funds can invoke their appraisal rights, namely the right to exit at a
fair price if they do not approve the contested transaction, when these are
available.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that activist hedge funds,
especially in the United States, often challenge the liquidation value as
determined by the board of directors, and if they are unable to obtain better
terms they threaten to file a statutory appraisal action. 142 One of the most
recent, high-profile appraisal rights cases involved Carl Icahn’s campaign
against the Dell going–private transaction in which the threat of invoking
appraisal rights was one of the several factors that led to a higher buyout
price.143

137. Implenia Shares Fall, Laxey Exerts Pressure, REUTERS, July 23, 2007.
138. Ian Bickerton, Hedge Funds Try to Block Stork Foundation’s Vote, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
6, 2007, at 17.
139. For empirical evidence on this type of hedge fund activism, see Katelouzou, supra
note 14, at 492–98.
140. Claudia Cattaneo, Fight Over Deer Creek Deal, NAT’L POST, Sept. 1, 2006, at FP1.
141. Ian Bickerton, Versatel Under Renewed Attack, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2007, at 21.
142. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 15, at 1038–39; Kaja Whitehouse and David
Enrich, Investors Tapping Arcane Law to Win Bigger Merger Payouts, DOW JONES NEWS
SERV., Feb. 5, 2007, available at Factiva, Doc. No. DJFHFT0020070720e3250013g (citing
examples of the use of statutory appraisal actions in activist campaigns in the United States).
For the potential use of the appraisal right from activist hedge funds in Italy, see Elisabetta
Bellini, Hedge Fund Activism in Italy, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 201, 226 (2009).
143. Stephen M. Davidoff, Exercising appraisal rights as a fresh form of shareholder
activism, INT’L N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2014, at 16.
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D. Theoretical Implications
The analysis provided so far has considered whether and how law
facilitates the different stages of an activist hedge fund campaign, taking
input from press and documentary sources. Suppose that the legal rules I
proposed above matter for hedge fund activism. What results might one
expect on the incidence and nature of hedge fund activism across different
countries?
One set of hypotheses involves the incidence and magnitude of
worldwide hedge fund activism. At the entry stage of an activist campaign,
the preceding analysis suggests that a higher number of activist campaigns
should be expected in countries with stronger mandatory disclosure of
firm–specific information.144 The underlying rationale is that mandatory
disclosure rules increase share price accuracy and address corporate
governance agency problems, and by providing more public information,
they can assist activist hedge funds in finding their targets. We have also
seen that a defining feature of the disciplining stage of hedge fund activism
is the formal or informal use of shareholder rights to enhance shareholder
value.145 A shareholder–friendly regulatory framework should arguably
foster the incidence of hedge fund activism because of its impact on the
disciplining stage of an activist campaign. Another channel through which
shareholder rights can affect the activist hedge funds’ intervention decision
is by protecting minority shareholders and disciplining managerial
behavior. This protective function of shareholder rights reflects the law
and finance literature which links the legal protection of minority
shareholder rights with dispersed share ownership and robust capital
markets.146 Correspondingly, all else being equal, activist hedge funds are
likely to choose target companies incorporated in countries with stronger
disclosure and shareholder protection regimes.
At the trading stage of an activist campaign, we have seen that strict
disclosure duties on significant holdings (either with having lower
thresholds, shorter time windows, or catching non–voting economic
positions and activist intentions) may limit the expected returns for

144. See supra text with accompanying notes 52–61 (showing the impact of mandatory
disclosure on the number of activist campaigns).
145. See supra notes 96–130 and accompanying text (examining the formal use of
shareholder rights to enhance shareholder value in the voting context and in connection with
the removal of directors, and the informal exercise of these rights in behind-the-scenes
negotiations and public articulation of activist demands through the media).
146. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the law
and finance literature).
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prospective activists.147 For example, one would expect an activist to build
up a larger stake in the United States, where the initial threshold is 5
percent, than in the United Kingdom, where an activist can engage in secret
trading and conceal its presence from the incumbents up to 3 percent.
Finally, with respect to the disciplining stage, the activist hedge funds’
choice of objectives and strategies might be a reflection of the shareholder
protection regime of the country in which the target company is located.
As seen above, a defining feature of the disciplining stage of hedge fund
activism is the use of shareholder rights to enhance shareholder value—
meaning legal rules governing the scope of the shareholder decision–
making procedures that activist hedge funds have at their disposal to
influence the corporate policy and governance, to exercise a veto over
board initiatives, to elect directors, and to bring a suit alleging managerial
wrongdoing.148 Correspondingly, all else being equal, one would expect
that the nature of the stated objectives and the aggressiveness of the
employed strategies would depend decisively on what pressure activist
hedge funds could bring to bear as shareholder.
The next two Parts of this Article present some preliminary empirical
evidence that addresses these hypotheses based on a hand–collected dataset
of activist hedge fund campaigns.
III.

HAND-COLLECTED DATASET OF ACTIVIST HEDGE FUND
CAMPAIGNS

A. Activism Sample and Data Collection
In this Article, I extend the original dataset of activist hedge fund
campaigns of 17 countries between January 1, 2000 and December 31,
2010 to 25 countries.149 The geographic area chosen represents a range of
developed (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and
developing/emerging (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Czech Republic,
India, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, Latvia, Russia, Slovenia,
and Turkey) countries. The countries vary along several important

147. See supra notes 65–95 and accompanying text (discussing four different aspects of
ownership disclosure related to hedge fund activism and the impact each has at the trading
stage).
148. See supra notes 99–142 and accompanying text (examining how specific
shareholder rights can empower activist hedge funds in constraining the incumbents’
discretion).
149. Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 473.
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dimensions, including the strength of their investor protection, their
financial development, their legal traditions, and their ownership patterns.
The selected geographic area had a great impact on the data collection.
While empirical studies on hedge fund activism directed at U.S. companies
are based on the detailed information disclosed by the Schedule 13D
filings,150 data on hedge fund activism outside the United States are much
harder to obtain and the sources vary enormously. There is no uniform
regulatory threshold requiring public disclosure of block holdings across
my sample countries, and, therefore, it is not possible to identify the first
purchase based, for example, on a 5 percent block–holder definition. Also,
unlike the United States, the sampled countries (except for Germany and
France since 2008) do not require investors to disclose what goals they are
pursuing with their stake building.151 The activist interventions and the
related data have therefore been collected from two resources: the Dow
Jones Factiva—an online database of business news—and regulatory
filings for the countries whose filings are available in Factiva.152
The data collection comprised a four–step procedure.153 As a first
step, data were hand-gathered from press reports available from Factiva
using the following search requests as inputs: “hedge fund” and
“shareholder” and “activist” for each of the 25 countries in the sample.
Factiva searches revealed a large number of potential activist interventions,
for which the names of the target company and the funds involved were
recorded. In a second step, I filtered out cases where the investor was not
an activist hedge fund. To identify which of the funds can be classified as
activists, for the purposes of my analysis, I searched the internet for the
websites of these funds and news articles describing them. In most cases, I
was able to filter out pension funds, individuals, regular companies, trusts,
and private equity/venture capital funds. For the remaining cases, I relied
on Factiva and used the following search requests as input: “(name of the
fund)” within the same paragraph “activist fund.” This screening yielded a
second case list, including 131 activist hedge funds in the broad sense.
Thirdly, I conducted a fresh news search in Factiva using the hedge fund
and target company names as keywords, to identify further aspects of the
activist campaigns, such as the activist hedge funds’ stated objectives and

150. See, e.g., Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1736–37 (discussing the importance of
Schedule 13D filings for empirical data).
151. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text (detailing the process in the United
States, the E.U, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom).
152. See Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 474 n.60 (describing the Dow Jones Factiva
database).
153. See id. at 474-76 (describing the collection process in detail).
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strategies. Sometimes, extensive searches on high–profile cases shed light
on other activist interventions. These cases were recorded and separate
searches (using the hedge fund and target company names as keywords)
were undertaken.
These three rounds of Factiva searches yielded a list of 934 activist
fund–target pairs. An activist campaign can include more than one hedge
fund–target pair when a consortium of two or more activist funds,
otherwise known as a wolf-pack, intervenes in the same target company.154
From this case list, I excluded events where the activist hedge fund simply
acquired a stake without putting any kind of pressure on the target (based
on the reported hedge funds’ objectives and strategies), or where the
primary purpose of the activist hedge fund was to engage in merger
arbitrage. The final sample is comprised of 432 activist campaigns
sponsored by 129 activist hedge funds. The sample involves 408 unique
companies and 494 hedge fund–target pairs.
Information about activist hedge funds’ stake holdings has been
collected from hedge fund–related press reports and from targets’ annual
reports. Regulatory filings on “significant holdings” have also been taken
into consideration for the countries whose filings are available in Factiva. I
further checked the accuracy of the activist ownership stakes, taking into
consideration information on the sampled firms’ ownership structures from
ORBIS/BvD—a global database of companies with data on descriptive
information, financials, news, annual reports, ownership, and mergers and
acquisitions. Finally, I conducted extensive news searches in Factiva to
identify the stated objectives and the employed strategies for each activist
hedge fund campaign. Because each activist hedge fund campaign may
have more than one objective, the sample is comprised of 946 stated
objectives and 883 activist strategies. The difference in numbers between
the stated objectives and the employed strategies is due to the fact that
hedge funds often employ a single strategy to achieve more than one
objective.
B. The Incidence and Magnitude of Worldwide Hedge Fund Activism
From the outset of this Article, I have noted that geographical
variations in the incidence and magnitude of hedge fund activism across
countries form the main motivation for studying the role of law in
facilitating hedge fund activism. Hedge fund activism originated in the
United States and then spread out to other countries in Europe and Asia.

154. I define an activist campaign as being launched by a “wolf-pack” when there is a
group of activists who explicitly or implicitly engage with the board and exercise influence.
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Although the U.S. market still has the greatest concentration of activist
hedge funds and activist campaigns, there are many well–documented
activist hedge fund interventions outside the United States.155
Figure 2 breaks down the empirical findings by target country. U.K.
and Japanese firms dominate the sample, making up 53.47 percent of the
total targets. There are four other countries with at least 20 interventions:
Canada, Germany, France, and the Netherlands. Within Europe, U.K.
companies are by far the dominant targets of activist hedge funds. Figure 2
shows that almost 53.8 percent of European activist campaigns target U.K.
companies. German companies are the second, much smaller, targets of
activist hedge funds in Europe.
Figure 2: Activist Hedge Fund Campaigns by Target Country
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Note: the following abbreviations are used: AR (Argentina), AU
(Australia), BR (Brazil), CA (Canada), CH (Switzerland), CL (Chile), CN
(China), CZ (Czech Republic), DE (Germany), ES (Spain), FR (France), IN
(India), IT (Italy), JP (Japan), LV (Latvia), MX (Mexico), MY (Malaysia),
NL (Netherlands), PK (Pakistan), RU (Russian Federation), SE (Sweden),
SI (Slovenia), TR (Turkey), UK (United Kingdom), ZA (South Africa)

The 432 activist campaigns were launched by 129 activist hedge
funds. The 54 different funds with three or more engagements are listed in
Appendix 1. These interventions are spread across the following countries:
Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the
155. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (providing examples of hedge fund
activism in Canada, Japan, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom).
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Netherlands, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
and the United Kingdom, although they are highly concentrated in a
handful of countries.156
In the case list, there are some well–known activist hedge funds that
have received wide public attention. Examples include The Children’s
Investment Fund (“TCI”), set up in 2004 by Chris Hohn;157 the Hermitage
Fund, set up in 1996 by William Browder, which has built its reputation on
its highly public engagements with Russian state–linked oil and gas
companies;158 and the U.S. fund Steel Partners, founded by Warren
Lichtenstein in 1990.159 Steel Partners has been particularly active in
Japan, until 2008, through Steel Partners Japan Strategic Fund, a joint
venture with Boston–based Liberty Square Asset Management LLC, which
was formed in 2002 as a special purpose investment vehicle to actively
invest in undervalued stocks in Japan.160 The list also includes other funds
that engage in shareholder activism, hedge–fund style. Examples of
traditional value–oriented fund managers, but with “offensive” activist
stances, include Brandes and Tweedy Browne.161 Although mutual funds
are not technically hedge funds, Franklin Mutual Advisers is also included
in the sample, because it behaves like any other activist fund in that it
builds up sizeable stakes proactively in order to influence the conduct of
corporate affairs.162 Appendix 1 also includes some of the raiders of the
1980s who have been resurfaced as activist funds, such as Guy Wyser–
Pratte, Vincent Bollore, Tito Tettamanti (Sterling Investment Group), and
Ron Brierley (Guinness Peat Group).163

156. See supra fig. 2.
157. Jenny Anderson, A Hedge Fund With High Returns and High-Reaching Goals.
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006.11.13/us/
13hedge.html? pagewanted=all&_r=0.
158. Georgina Leslie, Emerging Markets: Russia’s Crusader, GLOBAL INVESTOR (May
1, 2002), available at http://www.globalinvestormagazine.com/Article/2228217/Search/
Results/Emerging-Markets-Russias-Crusader.html?Keywords=emerging+markets
%3a+russia%27s+crusader.
159. See Jason Singer, With ‘80s Tactics, U.S. Fund Shakes Japan’s Cozy Capitalism,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2004, at A1 (discussing Steel Partner’s activist investments in Japan).
160. Id.
161. See e.g. Craig Karmin & Vanessa Fuhrmans, Bayer Meeting: View of Holder
Activism, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2001, at C1 (examining the activist campaign of Tweedy
Browne in Bayer AG, the German chemical and pharmaceutical giant); James Boxell,
Brandes cuts its final links with BAE Systems, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/04c56f88-353c-11da-9e12-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3a2tbnLTa
(discussing how Brandes, the US value investor, is adopting an increasingly activist stance
in the UK).
162. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Raiders in the healing arts, FIN. TIMES, Jun. 27, 1998, at 1 (discussing
how the so-called corporate raiders of the 1980s and 1990s, including Guy Wyser Pratte, are
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Clearly, no single activist fund dominates the sample: Laxey Partners
is the most active hedge fund with 28 interventions, which comprises
5.67% of all activist campaigns, while Steel Partners and the Murakami
Fund follow with 27 and 24 interventions, respectively.164 Though the
activist campaigns were launched by 129 different activist hedge funds,
there were a few hedge funds that predominated. The top ten activist hedge
funds launched 37.1 percent of the activist events, while the top twenty
launched 51.7 percent of the events studied.165
But why do activist hedge funds invest in particular countries, such as
the United Kingdom and Japan? Do national differences in corporate law
explain the different patterns in hedge fund activism? The next Part
addresses these questions and correspondingly examines how domestic,
corporate, and securities laws may influence activist hedge funds as they
find a potential target company and decide whether to buy shares and
launch an activist campaign.
IV.

SOME PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

In this Part, I make an empirical assessment and provide some
preliminary comparative evidence with respect to the effect on worldwide
activist hedge fund campaigns of three sets of legal rules: mandatory
disclosure, ownership disclosure rules, and rights bestowed on shareholders
by corporate law (which, in this context, means the legal rules governing
the scope activist funds have to utilize the shareholder decision–making
procedures to influence the corporate policy and governance, to exercise a
veto over board initiatives, to elect and remove directors, and to bring
shareholder–driven litigation).
Before proceeding, I need to stress that because I focus only on
activist hedge fund campaigns drawn from press reports, my analysis is
limited to an empirical assessment of the legal dynamics of the publicized
activist hedge fund campaigns, while behind the scenes negotiations and
other informal activist attempts are probably under–represented in my
sample. Another caveat is that to account for how well different legal
increasingly transforming to activist shareholders); Aaron O. Patrick, Bollore Focuses on
Advertising as His New Game, WALL. ST. J. Jul. 1, 2006, at B1 (calling Vincent Bollore as
“Carl Icahn with a French accent”); Andrea Felsted, Activist investors lift Amey holding,
FIN. TIMES Nov. 28, 2002, at 27 (discussing the activist campaign of Tito Tettamanti’s
Sterling Investment Group in Amey plc); Brierley the raider rides back in style, THE SUN.
TIM., Aug. 2, 1998, available at Factiva Doc. No. st00000020010927du82007fo (explaining
Sir Ron Brierley’s transformation from a corporate raider to a shareholder activist).
164. See infra app. 1.
165. See infra app. 1.
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systems protect certain rights, I draw on the work of previous legal indices
of shareholder protection and disclosure rules.166 A central methodological
tenet of legal indices is that legal rules can be coded. All legal indices
involve the reduction of a complex institutional reality to a summary
form—a variable coded with a number—which allows for statistical
analysis. Yet any empirical study devised to test the influence of legal
rules inevitably captures only a part of the differences between legal
systems.167 Diligent numerical coding, however, provides a fruitful basis
for analyzing comparative corporate governance phenomena across a large
number of countries in a very accessible, statistical form.
A. The Entry Stage
The empirical evidence presented in Part III of this Article reveals a
considerable diversity in the incidence of activist campaigns around the
world: U.K. and Japanese companies are the prominent targets among the
activist campaigns studied, while activist hedge funds engage in oversight
activities less often in Continental Europe and developing countries. The
preceding analysis suggests that, all else being equal, activist hedge funds
are likely to target companies incorporated in countries with stronger
disclosure and shareholder protection regimes.
To gauge whether the number of activist campaigns (ACTIVISM)
differs significantly by the strength of the mandatory disclosure and
shareholder protection, Table 1 computes (independent two–tailed) t–test
and Mann–Whitney U–test statistics.168 ACTIVISM counts how often
activist hedge funds target companies incorporated in the 25 sampled
countries between 2000 and 2010.169 These tests are relevant to a

166. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.
167. On the merits and limitations of the legal indices to account for differences of legal
systems, see Katelouzou, supra note 53.
168. I use a two-tailed test to test my hypotheses for robustness reasons. An alternative
possibility could be the use of a one-tailed test. However, the one-tailed test can only test
the effect in one direction disregarding the possibility of a relationship in the other direction.
Thus, the use of one-tailed tests artificially increases the power of the test (i.e., the
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis gets higher).
The t–test is a parametric test for testing the equality of means and is based on the
normality assumption of the population. The Mann–Whitney U–test, also known as
Wilkoxon rank sum test, is a non-parametric test for testing the equality of the medians.
Given the non-normality of the variable of interest—ACTIVISM—the parametric
assumptions underlying the t-test may not hold. The Mann-Whitney U-test is often used to
guard against this possibility. This test is robust in small samples and does not impose
strong assumptions on the distributional properties of the data. In the present context, the
results of the non-parametric test are thus more reliable than those of the parametric t-test.
169. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
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preliminary empirical assessment of the legal parameters affecting the entry
stage of an activist hedge fund campaign. As a measure of how stringent
the mandatory disclosure rules are, I use the prospectus disclosure index
(DISCL) of the law and finance literature and I divide the sample into two
regimes: Low DISCL and High DISCL.170 DISCL is a measurement of six
substantive elements of a country’s strength of disclosure requirements:
(1) prospectus; (2) insiders’ compensation; (3) ownership by large
shareholders; (4) inside ownership; (5) contracts outside the normal course
of business; and (6) transactions with related parties.171 The cut–off
between these two regimes is the median value of DISCL (=0.625).172 I
classify the countries with a value of DISCL greater than the median of
0.625 as High DISCL regimes, while the rest of the countries are classified
as Low DISCL regimes. Consistent with what is expected, the High DISCL
countries have higher mean values of ACTIVISM than the Low DISCL
countries; the t–test statistics reveal that the difference in mean ACTIVISM
between the High DISCL (36.5) and the Low DISCL (6.2) countries is
statistically significant at less than the 10 percent level (p=0.066). The
difference in median ACTIVISM between the High DISCL and Low DISCL
countries is also statistically significant at less than the 5 percent level
(p=0.023).
As a measure of the level of shareholder protection (SP) in the
sampled countries, I use the 30–country shareholder protection index,
which has been constructed under a project on “Law, Finance and
Development” at the Centre for Business Research (CBR) in the University
of Cambridge.173
The 30–country CBR index codes the level of
shareholder protection over the period of 1990–2013 and is comprised of

170. See Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006)
(devising the prospectus disclosure index). DISCL is, however, a fairly weak proxy for legal
rules on periodic disclosure, as it is constructed so as to reflect the agency problems between
prospective investors in an initial offering and the “promoter” who offers shares for the sale,
and it is not necessarily a proxy for post-offering disclosure rules. Unfortunately, reliable
international data on post-offering periodic disclosure are not available. Thus, for the time
being, I must rely on DISCL as a rough proxy for mandatory disclosure requirements.
171. Id. at 5–11.
172. To calculate the median value of DISCL in my sample, I used La Porta’s data on
“disclosure requirements” (DISCL). See id. at 15-16, tbl III.
173. See John Armour et al., Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development:
An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 343 (2009)
(relying on a previous CBR index which coded the shareholder protection rules for twenty
countries).
See also Centre for Business Research, Project: Law, Finance, and
Development, U. CAMBRIDGE, http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/research-projects/
completed-projects/law-finance-development (last visited April 15, 2015) (explaining the
variables and the coding methods involved).
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the following ten variables: (1) “powers of the general meeting for de facto
changes”; (2) “agenda setting power”; (3) “anticipation of shareholder
decision facilitated”; (4) “prohibition of multiple voting rights (super
voting rights)”; (5) “independent board members”; (6) “feasibility of
director’s dismissal”; (7) “private enforcement of director duties”; (8)
“shareholder action against resolutions of the general meeting”; (9)
“mandatory bid”; and (10) “disclosure of major share ownership.”174 To
construct SP, I calculate the arithmetic mean (average) of the aggregate
score of the ten variables between 1999 and 2009 for each of the 25
countries in my sample.175
To test the impact of the shareholder protection rules on the incidence
of hedge fund activism, I divide the sample into two regimes: High SP and
Low SP. The cut–off between High SP and Low SP is the median value of
SP (=5.641). As expected, Panel B of Table 1 reports that the High SP
countries have a higher number of activist campaigns than the Low SP
countries. The t–test statistic reveals that the difference in mean
ACTIVISM between the High SP (29.62) and the Low SP (3.92) countries is
statistically significant at less than the 5 percent level (p=0.049). The
difference in median ACTIVISM between the High SP and Low SP
countries is also statistically significant at less than the 5 percent level
(p=0.035).
TABLE 1: LEGAL RULES’ EFFECT ON THE INCIDENCE OF HEDGE
FUND ACTIVISM
This table reports key statistics (number (N), mean, and standard deviation)
for the dependent variable, ACTIVISM, by disclosure and shareholder protection
regime. Panel A divides the sample into two regimes—High DISCL and Low
DISCL—and reports the t–statistics for the average differences and the Mann–
Whitney U–test rank statistics, which is asymptotically normal, for the median
differences. Countries with a value of DISCL that is greater than the median of
value of DISCL for each sample are classified as High DISCL regimes, while those
with a value of DISCL that is less than or equal to the median of DISCL for each
sample are classified as Low DISCL regimes.

174. On the 30-country CBR shareholder protection index, see Dionysia Katelouzou &
Mathias Siems, Disappearing Paradigms in Shareholder Protection: Leximetric Evidence
for 30 Countries, 1990-2013, 15 J. CORP. L. STUDIES (forthcoming 2015).
175. The CBR shareholder protection index, however, does not code Australia.
Therefore, to measure shareholder protection in Australia, I rely on a study by Helen
Anderson, Michelle Welsh, and Ian Ramsay, which employs the same variable definition
and coding definition as the CBR index. See Helen Anderson et al., Shareholder and
Creditor Protection Indices Australia 1970-2010 (Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 641, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2163809.
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Panel B examines the difference in the number of activist campaigns by
shareholder protection (SP). Countries with a value of SP that is greater than the
median value of SP for each sample are classified as High SP regimes, while those
with a value of SP that is less than or equal to the median of SP for each sample are
classified as Low SP regimes. Panel B reports the t–statistics for the average
differences and the Mann–Whitney U–test rank statistics, which is asymptotically
normal, for the median differences.

Panel A: ACTIVISM by Disclosure (DISCL)
High DISCL

Low DISCL

T–test

Mann–
Whitney
U–test

ACTIVISM

N

Mean

Sd

N

Mean

Sd

10

36.5

45.246

10

6.2

10.358

2.064*

2.280**

Panel B: ACTIVISM by Shareholder Protection (SP)
High SP

Low SP

T–test

Mann–
Whitney
U–test

ACTIVISM

N

Mean

Sd

N

Mean

Sd

13

29.62

41.947

12

3.92

6.186

2.183**

2.158**

*** significant at the 1 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *
significant at the 10 percent level.

B. The Trading Stage
At the trading stage of an activist campaign, we have seen that several
aspects of the disclosure rules on significant holdings limit the expected
returns of prospective activists and have a chilling effect on the trading
benefits of an activist campaign.176 To examine the impact of ownership
disclosure rules on activist trading, I begin by describing the size of the
activist ownership stakes across my sample countries. Table 2 reports the
mean and median maximum and minimum percentage of the activist

176. See supra notes 65–95 and accompanying text.
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ownership blocks in the sample countries with more than ten activist
campaigns (by location of the target company). Evidently, there are big
cross–country differences; activist hedge funds in Italy build small stakes
(around 2 percent), whereas in the United Kingdom and Canada they build
relatively large ones. Also, in some countries—such as Canada, France,
Germany, and Italy—the minimum (both mean and median) ownership
stake falls under the triggering disclosure threshold.177 This might suggest
that activist hedge funds try to remain behind the public scenes, at least at
the beginning of their campaigns. Unsurprisingly, activist hedge funds
accumulate quite large ownership stakes in Canada, perhaps because they
can trade secretly up to the 10 percent triggering threshold.178
TABLE 2: MINIMUM AND
BY ACTIVIST HEDGE FUND

MAXIMUM OWNERSHIP STAKES (%) HELD

The table presents the minimum (Column 1) and maximum (Column 2)
ownership activist stakes (%) by hedge fund–target pairs. I calculated the
ownership activist stake on the basis of hedge fund–target pairs to account for the
presence of wolf–packs. Information about hedge funds’ stake holdings was
collected from three sources: the hedge funds’ related press reports, the targets’
annual reports, and regulatory filings on “significant holdings” (for the countries
whose filings are available in Factiva). Of the 494 hedge fund–target pairs, 55 are
excluded due to unavailability of ownership data. Some of these unreported cases
involve wolf–packs, in which there is no information for each participating fund’s
stake, although the total ownership for a group is recorded.

177. The initial disclosure threshold is set at 10% in Canada, 5% in Germany and
France, and 2% in Italy for the period studied (2000–2010). See infra note 180 and
accompanying text.
178. It is noteworthy that in March 2013 the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA)
proposed, among other changes intended to provide greater transparency about significant
holdings, to lower the reporting threshold from 10% to 5%. However, in October 2014, the
CSA announced that it will not be moving forward with the proposed reform. See CSA
Notice 62-307 Update on Proposed Amendments to Multilateral Instrument 62-104 TakeOver Bids and Issuer Bids, National Instrument 62-103 Early Warning System and Related
Take-Over Bid and Insider Reporting Issues and National Policy 62-203 Take-over Bids
and Issuer Bids, CANADIAN SEC. ADM’RS (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/
en/SecuritiesLaw_csa_20141010_62-307_proposed-admendments-multilateralinstrument.htm.
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Minimum Ownership

Maximum Ownership

(1)

(2)

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Australia

6.71%

6.38%

12.04%

12.57%

Canada

8.39%

8.61%

13.07%

12.10%

France

4.06%

3.00%

9.08%

10.03%

Germany

3.53%

2.92%

6.44%

5.68%

Italy

1.84%

1.97%

2.90%

2.23%

Japan

6.57%

5.00%

12.54%

10.00%

Netherlands

5.97%

5.12%

9.50%

9.95%

Switzerland

6.78%

6.70%

13.78%

9.45%

UK

8.43%

4.50%

13.11%

10.93%

All Countries

6.10%

4.93%

11.54%

10%

A counterargument is that these findings could be driven by the initial
thresholds necessitating public disclosure of share ownership. To put it
simply, it may well have been that the press coverage was driven by the
disclosure rules, with reporters finding out about the interventions from the
public disclosures. Correspondingly, the press was finding out about
instances of hedge fund activism in Italy that would have stayed below the
radar in Canada, meaning that the size of the average stake I found for
Canada would have been larger than the one I found for Italy. However, in
one–third of the activist campaigns studied, the filing is not the market’s
first news of the activist ownership block; rather, the insurgent(s)
accumulate an entry ownership stake which remains below the triggering
ownership threshold.179 In 4 (out of 12) campaigns, the entry activist
ownership stake remains below 2 percent; in 35 (out of 166) campaigns it
179. A notable example is the Knight Vinke’s investment in the Italian oil company Eni
SpA, where in 2009 Knight Vinke, having accumulated an ownership stake below 1%,
publicly pressured Eni to break up. See Vincent Boland Knight, Vinke Urges Eni Break Up,
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/92f124b8-adf2-11de87e7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3UN3ucaXP. Note that, in Italy, hedge funds are subject to
the same disclosure requirements generally applicable to any investor with a shareholding
higher than 2%, and then crossing or falling below 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 35%,
40%, 45%, 50%, 66.6%, 75%, 90%, 95%. See Erik Vermeulen, Beneficial Ownership and
Control: A Comparative Study—Disclosure, Information and Enforcement (OECD
Corporate Governance Working Paper, No. 7, 2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
5k4dkhwckbzv-en.
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remains below 3 percent; in 63 (out of 204) campaigns it remains below 5
percent; and in 30 (out of 52) campaigns it remains below 10 percent, when
the triggering thresholds are 2, 3, 5, and 10 percent, respectively.180 The
boxplots in Figure 3 below confirm that activist hedge funds tend to amass
lower thresholds in countries with lower initial ownership disclosure
thresholds. The median entry ownership stake of activist hedge funds is
2.22, 5, 5.38, and 9.02 percent, respectively, in countries with 2, 3, 5, and
10 percent initial notification thresholds, respectively; whereas in countries
with no disclosure obligations, the average entry ownership stake is 19
percent. However, the median entry activist ownership stakes do not
trigger notification of major shareholder rules in countries with a 10%
triggering disclosure threshold.

.2
0

.1

entryownership

.3

.4

Figure 3: Activist Hedge Funds’ Entry Ownership Stakes by Initial
Disclosure Threshold

0.02

0.03

0.05

0.1

no

180. Italy has the lowest initial disclosure threshold (2%) among my sample countries.
The United Kingdom applies a 3% threshold throughout the period studied, whereas
Germany and Switzerland in 2007 and Spain in 2009 decreased the 5% initial disclosure
threshold to 3% (in line with the U.K. regime). Australia, Brazil, France, Japan, the
Netherlands, and Sweden apply a 5% threshold throughout the period studied. Malaysia
replaced the previous 2% threshold with a 5% one in 2001, whereas Russia increased the
initial 5% disclosure threshold to 25% in 2003, but decreased it again to 5% in 2006.
Turkey is the only country in my sample that did not require any disclosure of major share
ownership until 2002, when it introduced a 5% initial disclosure threshold. Finally, Canada
applies a 10% threshold. For a detailed explanation of the relevant disclosure thresholds, as
well as explanations and references to the relevant provisions of law, see Centre for
Business Research, supra note 173.
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To further gauge whether activist hedge funds build up smaller entry
stakes in countries with more stringent ownership disclosure thresholds,
Table 3 computes a one–way ANOVA test.181 The average entry
ownership stake of activist hedge funds is 2.9, 6.9, 7.3, and 9 percent in
countries with 2, 3, 5, and 10 percent initial notification thresholds,
respectively. The difference in the average entry ownership stakes is
statistically significant for the natural logarithm of ENTRYOWNER at the 1
percent level.182
TABLE 3: OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE RULES’ EFFECT ON ACTIVIST
OWNERSHIP STAKES
Columns 1 to 4 of this Table present the sample size and the average entry
ownership stake of activist hedge funds when the triggering ownership threshold is
2, 3, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. Column 5 presents the sample size and the
average entry ownership stake of activist hedge funds when there are no ownership
disclosure obligations. The ownership disclosure measure (OWNERDISCL) equals
1 if shareholders who acquire at least 2 percent of the companies’ capital have to
disclose it; equals 0.75 if this concerns 3 percent of the capital; equals 0.5 if this
concerns 5 percent; equals 0.25 if this concerns 10 percent; and equals 0 when
183
there is no disclosure obligation.
To construct OWNERDISCL, I take into
account the threshold percentage of disclosure at the first year of investment for
each activist campaign. I assign one score for each of the 494 hedge fund–target
pairs. Column 3 presents the one–way ANOVA test. The dependent variable
(ENTRYOWNER), which represents the ownership that activist hedge funds build
up when they begin investing in their target companies, does not meet the

181. I use one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) because I have one categorical
independent variable (OWNERDISCL) and one continuous dependent variable
(ENTRYOWNER). The one-way analysis of variance is used to test the claim that three or
more population means are equal. This is an extension of the two independent sample ttests. For definitions of the variables, see Table 4.
182. However, the one-way ANOVA test does not test that one mean is less than
another, only whether they are equal or at least one is different. This is why future empirical
research needs to test whether this difference really exists, and if yes, whether it is
attributable to other factors—although there might be some evidence to support the claim
that there is a difference in the mean of activist ownership stakes across the five disclosure
regimes.
183. This definition is preferable to the one used in the CBR shareholder protection
index (Variable 10), as it accounts for differences between countries with a 2% and a 3%
ownership threshold. See supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text. For a detailed
analysis of the evolution of ownership disclosure between 1995 and 2005 based on Variable
10 of the CBR index, see M.C. Schouten & M.M. Siems, The Evolution of Ownership
Disclosure Rules Across Countries, 10 J. CORP. L. STUDIES 451 (2010) (analyzing the
development of ownership disclosure between 1995 and 2005).
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normality assumption. This is why I compute the one–way ANOVA test with the
dependent variable being the natural logarithm of ENTRYOWNER.

ENTRY
OWNE
R

OWNER
DISCL =1

OWNER
DISCL
=0.75

OWNER
DISCL
=0.5

OWNER
DISCL
=0.25

OWNER
DISCL
=0

One-way
ANOVA

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

N

Mea
n

N

Mea
n

N

Mea
n

N

Mea
n

N

Mea
n

1
2

0.02
9

16
6

0.06
9

20
4

0.07
3

5
2

0.09
0

5

0.14
9

8.767**
*

As for the maximum ownership stakes of the 494 hedge fund–target
pairs studied, in only 10 does the insurgent surpass the corresponding
mandatory bid thresholds, while in the 95th percentile, activist hedge funds
hold 28.76 percent of the target company. Even more interestingly,
different patterns arise across countries depending on the actual thresholds
that trigger a mandatory bid.184 For instance, in the United Kingdom,
where the mandatory bid threshold is 30 percent, there are 24 activist
maximum ownership positions between 25 and 29.99 percent. Even when
activist hedge funds form wolf–packs, they rarely find themselves subject
to an obligation to make a general offer.185 In Canada, however, where the
mandatory bid threshold is 20 percent, the activist hedge funds studied tend
to acquire stakes below 20 percent, which are evidently smaller than their
counterparts in the United Kingdom. Surprisingly, perhaps, activist hedge
funds in the Netherlands, where there is no mandatory bid threshold, never
surpass 30 percent, while there is only one activist hedge fund
accumulating an ownership stake of more than 20 percent in a Dutch
company. These findings should be read in light of the activist hedge
funds’ general aversion to acquiring corporate control.186 From the 883
activist hedge fund strategies studied, only 37 involve takeover bids,187
184. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text (describing when an acquirer must
make a tender offer to all shareholders (mandatory bid rule) and the frequency of such an
occurrence).
185. In my sample, none of the two wolf-packs targeting U.K. companies triggered the
mandatory bid rule, despite the participating activist hedge funds together carrying more
than 30% of the company’s voting rights. (Data on file with the author).
186. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 23, at 58–60 (distinguishing between the
market for corporate control and the market for corporate influence, and suggesting that
activist hedge funds are associated with the latter).
187. See Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 497 (explaining characteristics of hedge fund
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while empirical evidence on hedge fund activism in the United States—
where the would–be–acquirers can bid as small or as large of a percentage
of the target company as they wish188—shows that even in the absence of a
mandatory bid rule, activist hedge funds rarely attempt to take over the
targeted company.189
In addition to ownership disclosure rules, we have seen that tight rules
on acting–in–concert may introduce an additional barrier to the trading
stage of an activist campaign.190 Data on how often activist hedge funds
have avoided being treated as a “group” for purposes of disclosure
regulations are very difficult to obtain. In the United States, Thomas
Briggs collected data on hedge fund activism during a 20–month period
and reported that thirteen out of the 52 campaigns he studied involved some
kind of pack activity.191 In their clinical study on activist engagement by
the Hermes Focus Fund, Professors Marco Becht, Julian Franks, Colin
Mayer, and Stefano Rossi also provide some data about behind the scenes
shareholder collaboration.192 The sample studied here provides a window
through which to examine the impact of acting–in–concert legislation in a
wide range of countries. From the total 432 activist campaigns studied, 50
appear to involve a form of wolf–pack, while four campaigns involve two
different wolf–packs formed from different activist hedge funds and/or
different time periods. From the total 54 wolf–packs, only 6 have been
caught by acting–in–concert legislation and subjected to filing
requirements, while the other 48 involve activist funds mutually supportive
but separate filers or other coalitions reported in the press.193

activism based on empirical evidence).
188. The 1986 Williams Act—the main federal law governing public takeover bids (or
tender offers)—does not impose a mandatory bid rule. Pennsylvania, Maine, and South
Dakota, however, have “control share cash-out” laws triggered at 20%, 25% and 50%,
respectively. See Klaus J. Hopt, European Takeover Reform of 2012/2013—Time to ReExamine the Mandatory Bid, 15 EUR. BUS. ORG. REV. 143, 168 (2014).
189. See, e.g., Brav et al., supra note 15, at 1743 (summarizing the occurrence of
different hedge fund tactic categories).
190. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (discussing when activist hedge
funds team up with other hedge funds and the benefits of these arrangements for the hedge
funds involved).
191. Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An
Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. LAW 681, 698 (2007).
192. Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical
Study of the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3093 (2009).
193. Data on file with the author.
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C. The Disciplining Stage
After accumulating a sizeable stake, the insurgent(s) announces a
change in the firm’s policy it believes as value–enhancing and then tries to
get that change carried out (disciplining stage). The overarching goal of
activist hedge funds is superior risk–adjusted returns. In the course of their
campaigns, however, they state a variety of objectives, which can be sorted
into three broad groups: corporate governance activism, corporate
management activism, and corporate control activism. I use the term
corporate management activism to describe activist campaigns with the aim
of determining capital, operational, and strategic changes that are necessary
for improving firm performance. Corporate governance activism includes
activist events launched in the name of corporate governance best practices
on matters including board independence, executive compensation, and
anti–takeover defenses. Lastly, corporate control activism encompasses
not only attempts to direct the affairs of the target firm replacing the
majority of the board members, but also attempts to facilitate control
transactions, such as mergers and sales of the company to third parties and
interventions where the activist makes an offer to buy the target.
Data that I have compiled on the stated objectives of activist hedge
fund campaigns provide a helpful way of examining whether hedge fund
activism operates similarly across different countries.194 Table 4 (Panel A)
breaks down the activist objectives in the three broad categories of activism
(corporate governance, corporate management, and corporate control) by
target country. Overall, the review of the stated objectives suggests that in
my sample countries, as in the United States, activist hedge funds engage
with incumbent management intent on bringing about changes in corporate
strategy and financial structure to enhance returns to shareholders; in
almost 41.2 percent of the stated objectives, hedge funds tried to force a
capital–related or an operational change (corporate management activism).
This should not be striking if we take into account that maximization of
shareholder value is paramount for activist hedge funds. Corporate
governance activism is also quite popular, making up 30.1 percent of the
activist objectives, while engagement in transfers of control is the activist
hedge funds’ stated objective in 28.7 percent of the total sample. The
prominence of corporate management activism is evident in most of the
countries studied, with the exception of Canada where the majority of the
activist objectives (36.1 percent) relate to corporate control activism.195
194. Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 491–95.
195. The relatively high frequency of corporate control activism in Canada is probably
due to the fact that U.S. hedge funds launch U.S.-style proxy fights in Canadian companies.
For an account of hedge fund activism targeting Canadian companies, see Brian R. Cheffins,
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Also, in France, Australia, and Switzerland, most of the activist objectives
relate to corporate governance changes.196
To test whether these cross–country differences in the activists’ stated
objectives are attributed to cross–country differences in the protection of
shareholder rights, Table 4 (Panel B) groups the countries by their
shareholder protection regime in High SP and Low SP countries.197
Evidently, there is a common pattern across the two groups: activist hedge
funds engage more often in corporate management activism. From the 741
stated objectives of the activist campaigns targeting companies located in
High SP regimes, 41.7 percent fall within the corporate management camp,
while corporate governance and corporate control objectives amount to
30.5 and 27.8 percent, respectively.
The proportion of corporate
management activism is slightly lower in Low SP countries (39.5 percent),
while activist hedge funds engage more often with corporate control
transactions in Low SP countries (30.8 percent). The chi–square test
suggests, however, that there is no statistically significant association
between the shareholder protection regime and the stated objective. That
is, the activist stated objectives are not attributable to differences in the
shareholder protection regime.
TABLE 4: ACTIVIST OBJECTIVES AND SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
RULES
Panel A reports the summary of activist hedge funds’ stated objectives by
country. The sample includes 946 stated objectives across 432 activist campaigns.
The difference in numbers is due to the fact that in each hedge fund–target pair the
hedge fund can have multiple objectives. Panel B reports key statistics for the
dependent variable, OBJECTIVE, by shareholder protection regime. OBJECTIVE
is a categorical variable, which equals 1 if the stated objective of hedge fund
activism is directed to improvements of corporate management (corporate
management activism); equals 2 if the stated objective of hedge fund activism is
directed to improvements of corporate governance (corporate governance
activism); and equals 3 if the stated objective of hedge fund activism is directed to

Hedge Fund Activism Canadian Style 47 U. B.C. L. REV. 1 (2014) (describing the role of
hedge fund activism in Canadian corporate governance).
196. The relatively high frequency of corporate governance activism in Australia,
France, and Switzerland is likely due to the relatively high number of activist campaigns
seeking minority board representation and ousting of key executives without acquiring
control of the company (9, 16, and 8, respectively). Further on this category of activism, see
Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 492, 494–95 (classifying the corporate governance-related
stated objectives of activist hedge funds into nine sub-categories).
197. Countries with less than five-stated activist objectives are omitted (i.e., Spain,
Turkey, Brazil, India, and Malaysia).
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changes in corporate control (corporate control activism). Countries with a value
of SP that is greater than the median value of SP for each sample are classified as
High SP regimes, while those with a value of SP that is less or equal to the median
of SP for each sample are classified as Low SP regimes. N is total number of the
variables of interest observed in each shareholder protection regime. Countries
with less than 5 stated objectives are omitted. Panel B also reports chi–square test
statistics for the dependent variable, OBJECTIVE.

Panel A: Activist Hedge Funds' Stated Objectives by Country
Corporate

Corporate

Corporate

Management

Governance

Control

N

%

N

%

N

%

All Countries

390

41.23%

285

30.13%

271

28.65%

UK

122

44.53%

76

27.74%

76

27.74%

Japan

112

51.38%

54

24.77%

52

23.85%

Canada

47

32.64%

45

31.25%

52

36.11%

Germany

27

40.30%

13

19.40%

27

40.30%

France

14

25.93%

24

44.44%

16

29.63%

Netherlands

20

45.45%

9

20.45%

15

34.09%

Australia

8

25.00%

14

43.75%

10

31.25%

Switzerland

10

35.71%

12

42.86%

6

21.43%

Italy

8

40.00%

8

40.00%

4

20.00%

Russia

6

31.58%

13

68.42%

South Africa

4

21.05%

11

57.89%

4

21.05%

Sweden

8

47.06%

5

29.41%

4

23.53%
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Panel B: OBJECTIVE by Shareholder Protection (SP)
Low SP

High SP
N

%

N

%

OBJECTIVE (=1)

309

41.70%

77

39.50%

OBJECTIVE (=2)

226

30.50%

58

29.70%

OBJECTIVE (=3)

206

27.80%

60

30.80%

Chi–square test (Low

0.691

SP vs. High SP)

Activist hedge funds use a range of strategies to pursue their stated
objectives, founded upon the ownership of a sizeable, though non–
controlling, stake. In a previous study, I presented evidence on activist
hedge fund strategies across 17 countries between 2000 and 2010.198 The
883 activist strategies studied had an escalating degree of hostility against
the target company, from meetings and letter writings (gentle activism), to
public criticism and shareholder resolutions or board representation without
publicly-reported management confrontation (soft activism), to efforts to
replace the board or to take control of the company (aggressive activism).199
Since I have examined 432 activist campaigns, but 883 activist
strategies, from which 270 are assigned as aggressive activism, it is useful
to investigate the aggressiveness of each activist campaign. Table 5 (Panel
A) provides evidence on the aggression of global activist hedge fund’s
campaigns and confirms that activist hedge funds are not mainly
aggressive, as the majority of activist campaigns involve only gentle and/or
soft tactics (237 out of 432 activist campaigns). Panel A also reports that
there is considerable congruence between the activist strategies, with solely
aggressive campaigns being the minority across all the sample countries.
However, in several aspects in terms of coverage and emphasis there are
some cross–country differences. For instance, the overwhelming majority
of activist campaigns in Japan (74.76 percent) involve only gentle and/or
soft tactics, while the corresponding percentage is 72.7 and 53.1 percent in
Italy and the United Kingdom, respectively. On the other hand, more
aggressive tactics are adopted in Switzerland, France, and Germany, where
198. Katelouzou, supra note 14, at 484.
199. Id. at 485–86.
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the overwhelming majority of activist campaigns involve at least one
aggressive tactic (80, 68, and 63.3 percent, respectively).
Panel B of Table 5 groups the countries by shareholder protection in
High SP regimes and Low SP regimes.200 The aggressiveness of the activist
hedge funds’ campaigns is measured in two categories (0: gentle/soft, 1:
aggressive). Evidently, there is a common pattern across the two groups:
activist hedge funds mainly use gentle/soft approaches. The proportion of
gentle and/or soft strategies in High SP and Low SP regimes amounts to
53.1 and 55.3 percent, respectively. Although there is a small difference in
favor of the Low SP countries, the chi–square test shows that this difference
is not statistically significant.
TABLE 5: ACTIVIST STRATEGIES AND SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION
RULES
Panel A reports the aggressiveness of each activist campaign in my sample by
country. The sample includes 883 activist strategies across 432 activist campaigns.
In order to examine the aggressiveness of each activist campaign, I split the activist
campaigns into two groups: those that include only gentle and soft tactics and
those that include at least one aggressive tactic. I track the evolution of each
campaign using information from press reports. Panel B reports key statistics for
the dependent variable, AGGRESSION, by shareholder protection regime.
AGGRESSION is a dummy variable, which equals “0” if the activist hedge fund
employs only gentle/soft tactics and equals “1” if the activist employs mixed (both
gentle/soft and aggressive) or solely aggressive tactics. Countries with a value of
shareholder protection, or “SP”, that is greater than the median of value of SP for
each sample are classified as High SP regimes, while those with a value of SP that
is less than or equal to the median of SP for each sample are classified as Low SP
regimes. “N” is the total number of the interest variables observed in each
shareholder protection regime. Panel B also reports the chi–square test statistics
for the dependent variable, AGGRESSION.

200. Countries with less than five activist campaigns are omitted (i.e., Brazil, India,
Malaysia, Spain and Turkey).
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Panel A: Activist Hedge Fund Campaigns by Aggression
Gentle/Soft

Aggressive

N

%

N

%

All Countries

237

54.86%

195

45.14%

UK

68

53.13%

60

46.88%

Japan

77

74.76%

26

25.24%

Canada

28

47.46%

31

52.54%

Germany

11

36.67%

19

63.33%

France

8

32.00%

17

68.00%

Netherlands

11

55.00%

9

45.00%

Australia

8

42.11%

11

57.89%

Italy

8

72.73%

3

27.27%

Switzerland

2

20.00%

8

80.00%

South Africa

6

75.00%

2

25.00%

Sweden

4

66.67%

2

33.33%

Russia

1

20.00%

4

80.00%

Panel B: AGGRESSION by Shareholder Protection (SP)
High SP

Low SP

N

%

N

%

AGGRESSION (=0)

180

53.10%

47

55.30%

AGGRESSION (=1)

159

46.90%

38

44.70%

Chi–square test (Low SP vs.

0.132

High SP)

D. Summary of Empirical Findings
Drawing together the preliminary empirical findings presented in this
Part, one can arrive at a precursory conclusion: the extent to which law
matters depends on the stage that hedge fund activism has reached. Ceteris
paribus, the number of activist hedge fund campaigns is larger in countries
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with stronger mandatory disclosure and shareholder protection regimes
(entry stage). Of these two legal variables, however, shareholder protection
has a more significant effect on the incidence of worldwide hedge fund
activism.
At the trading stage of an activist campaign, activist hedge funds
acquire smaller entry ownership stakes in countries with lower initial
disclosure thresholds. The empirical data studied also reveal that other
parameters of the ownership disclosure rules—such as the acting–in–
concert legislation and the mandatory bid rule—have somewhat weaker
ramifications for the trading stage of an activist campaign.
Finally, at the disciplining stage of an activist campaign, shareholder
protection seems to have little explanatory power, as the activist stated
objectives and employed strategies are not attributable to differences in the
shareholder protection regime. This suggests that while a minimum
protection of the shareholder rights is a necessary condition for the activist
hedge funds’ entry to a target company, subsequent choices of the activist
objectives and strategies are, at least in part, endogenous to the ways in
which the legal regimes affect hedge fund activism. Because activist hedge
funds pursue activism as a profit–making strategy, they choose a target
company and amass a sizeable stake only when the anticipated benefits
from intervention outweigh the costs associated with the different stages of
an activist campaign. Activist hedge funds, therefore, state the objectives
and resort to the strategies that enable them to make profits from activism
irrespective of the shareholder rights afforded to them.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Triggered by the differences in the incidence, magnitude, and nature
of worldwide hedge fund activism, this Article has provided a theoretical
and empirical framework for understanding the legal parameters
underpinning the monitoring role that activist hedge funds can play and
how effectively they can play it. On the theoretical side, this Article
introduces an activist hedge fund campaign as a sequence of four stages:
entry, trading, disciplining, and exit. This four–stage framework serves as
a heuristic device to identify a number of legal factors likely to determine
the emergence and evolution of worldwide hedge fund activism. On the
empirical side, this Article expands the empirical base for the study of the
relationship between law and hedge fund activism in two ways: first, it
tracks the emergence of worldwide hedge fund activism on the basis of a
hand-collected dataset on activist hedge fund campaigns between 2000 and
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2010 across 25 countries; and second, it draws upon legal indices provided
by the law and finance scholarship and leximetric coding techniques to
capture whether law is facilitative of hedge fund activism.
The empirical findings of Part IV show that international differences
in the scope of mandatory disclosure rules and ownership disclosure rules
are among the factors that shape the entry and trading stage of activist
hedge fund campaigns across countries, respectively. More importantly,
the ability of activist hedge funds to engage with directors of companies on
issues concerning the corporate governance or the performance of the target
company is largely dependent on the law protecting shareholder rights—
meaning, in this context, legal rules governing the scope that activist hedge
funds have to utilize the shareholder decision–making procedures to affect
changes in corporate policy and governance, to exercise a veto over board
initiatives, to appoint and remove directors, and to bring litigation. I find
that the frequency of activist hedge fund campaigns increases with the
extent to which the rights of shareholders are protected from managerial
discretion. However, the data with respect to the disciplining stage of
activist hedge fund campaigns provide little support that the activist
objectives and the employed strategies are a reflection of the shareholder
protection regime of the country in which the target company is located.
Though it may appear paradoxical, the preliminary findings of this study
suggest that while a minimum protection of the shareholder rights is a
necessary condition for the activist hedge funds’ entry, subsequent choices
of the activist objectives and strategies are, at least in part, endogenous to
the ways in which the legal regimes affect hedge fund activism.
Worldwide hedge fund activism, however, is not a mere reflex of the
legal parameters studied in this Article. One may adduce extra–legal
factors explaining the differences in the incidence, nature, and outcomes of
hedge fund activism across countries. Such factors include, but are not
limited to, the performance, size, and ownership structure of the target
company, as well as the nature of the influential activities and domicile of
the insurgent. Future research will aim to test the impact of those
additional factors on the different stages of an activist hedge fund campaign
by multivariate empirical means. It is important to consider empirical data
from a multitude of countries—both before and after the 2008 financial
crisis—to understand why the incidence and magnitude of hedge fund
activism differs around the world and whether hedge fund activism will be
a permanent feature of corporate governance. Although further empirical
research is required to shed light on the complex interplay between hedge
fund activism and law, this study reinforces, rather than undercuts, the
perception that law matters to worldwide hedge fund activism, mostly by
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vindicating shareholder rights as a determinant of the differences in the
incidence and prevalence of hedge fund activism across the world.
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APPENDIX 1
HEDGE FUND TARGET PAIRS BY HEDGE FUND AND GEOGRAPHY
The table in this appendix reports the frequency distribution of hedge
funds–target pairs by hedge fund and geography in the hand–collected
dataset between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2010. Only the hedge
funds with three or more engagements are listed. It should be noted that
the hedge funds involved in wolf–packs get credited individually. My
sample includes 432 activist campaigns, but 494 hedge fund–target pairs.201

201. For the abbreviations, see supra Figure 2. The following abbreviations are also
used: MC (Monaco), SG (Singapore), and VG (Virgin Islands).
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